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INTRODUCTION
In an intellectual propertr theft case, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $95
million in punitive damages. A Utah jury awarded, and the State Supreme
Court upheld, $145 million in punitive damages against State Farm
Insurance for the defendant's alleged bad faith.2 Another jury hit Phillip
Morris Inc. with a $3 billion punitive damages verdict after finding the
company liable for fraud, negligence, and making a defective product.3 It
is against the backdrop of cases like these that judges and commentators
have expressed concerns about punitive damages. "Awards of punitive
J The federal district judge ultimately reduced the damages. Marc Davis, Record Civil Award Cut
to $12.6 Million; But Judge Rips Defendants, Calling Them "Vultures," VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 26,
2002, at 01, available at 2002 WL 23544757.
2 The United States Supreme Court recently reversed the punitive damages in this case, finding a
violation of due process. State Farm Mut. Auto. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003). I discuss the
Court's decision in Part IIl.B.
3 Boeken v. Phillip Morris Inc., No. BC 226593 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, June 6,
2001) (cited in California Jury Slams Philip Morris with $3 Billion Verdict, 15 AIDS Litig. Rep.
(Andrews Publ'ns Inc.) No.7, at28 (Dec. 10,2001».
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damages are skyrocketin~."4 "We note ... our concern about punitive
damages that 'run wild. '"
Similarly, examples of the application of forfeiture laws have raised
eyebrows. The sale of cocaine worth $250 resulted in the forfeiture of an
apartment worth $140,000 in one case. In another case, a defendant's farm
was seized after she pled guilty to selling 2.9 grams of cocaine.6 Again,
judges and commentators have expressed concerns. Justice Clarence
Thomas has theorized that, "[i]mproperly used, forfeiture could become
more like a roulette wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent but
hapless owners whose property is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded
to punish those who associate with criminals, than a component of a system
ofjustice."?
These types of concerns, at least in part, have led the United States
Supreme Court to strike punitive damafes awards of $145 million and $2
million as unconstitutionally excessive and the forfeiture of $357,144 as
"grossly disproportional to the gravity of the [defendant's] offense.,,9 The
Supreme Court recent~ confirmed that it will continue to give teeth to
proportionality review1 of such monetary punishments. During the current
4 Browning-Ferris Indus. of VI. v. Kelco, 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). See also John Calvin Jefferies, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of
Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (1986) (noting that "punitive damages are out of control").
5 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I, 18 (1991). See also Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A.
Behrens & Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Reining in Punitive Damages "Run Wild": Proposals for Reform
by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1004, 1010 (1999) (arguing that "excessive
punitive damages awards continue to be a major problem in many states" and "[r]eform is needed to
address the chilling effect that the threat of runaway punitive damages can have on ... the general
public"); Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REV.
408, 417 (discussing the consequences of punitive damages for civil defendants).
6 See Chet Little, Note, Civil Forfeiture and the Excessive Fines Clause: Does Bajakajian Provide
False Hope for Drug-Related Offenders?, II U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 203, 205 n.12 (2000) (citing
United States v. 58 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1992», n.14 (citing United States v.
Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, I540-41 (4th Cir. 1989».
7 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 456 (Thomas, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 517 U.S. 1163
(1996). See also Little, supra note 6, at 204-05 ("While government agencies fill their coffers with
proceeds from drug-related seizures, instances of forfeiture abuse become more routine across the
country."); W. David George, Finally, an Eyefor an Eye: The Supreme Court Lets the Punishment Fit
the Crime in Austin v. United States, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 509, 509 (1994) ("Civil forfeiture of assets is
one of the federal government's most powerful tools in the war on drugs.").
8 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003); BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The Court held that $2 million in punitive damages was excessive
when BMW failed to disclose that it had repainted the car Dr. Gore purchased. The jury awarded Dr.
Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. The Alabama Supreme
Court reduced the punitive damages award to $2 million upon determining that the jury had incorrectly
used a multiplier, which included BMW's failures to disclose such presale repairs in states other than
Alabama. [d.
9 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998).
10 By the term "proportionality review" I refer to an evaluation of a sentence as it relates to the
offense for which the defendant was convicted. That is, an answer to the question of whether the
punishment fits the crime. This is in contrast to "comparative proportionality review" which "purports
to inquire ... whether the penalty is ... unacceptable in a particular case because it is disproportionate
to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime." Barry Latzer, The Failure of
Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital Cases (With Lessons from New Jersey), 64 ALB. L.
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term, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell ("State
Farm"), the Supreme Court reversed a punitive damages award of $145
million against State Farm Insurance. I I Yet, ironically, the Court has not
shown the same concern about excessiveness and disproportionality when
the punishment is imprisonment, a deprivation of liberty. In fact, during
the 2002-2003 Supreme Court term, the Court upheld life sentences of
minor theft offenses committed by recidivists. 12
The Supreme Court has only once struck a term of imgrisonment as
disproportionate and thus an Eighth Amendment violation. Before the
current term, when the Court last considered the issue of proportionate
punishment with respect to prison sentences in 1991, it affirmed a life
sentence without the possibility of parole for the defendant's first offense,
which was possession of 672 grams of cocaine. 14 This article argues that
the Court should give terms of imprisonment at least the same level of
scrutiny used to evaluate punitive damages awards and forfeitures for
proportionality. To the extent that the Court will second-guess juries in the
punitive damages context, and even to second-guess Congress as to
forfeitures of property, the Court should be consistent across these subject
areas that involve types of punishment and thus engage in a genuine
proportionality review of terms of imprisonment. However, given the
decisions in Andrade and Ewing, discussed below in Part lILA, there does
not seem to be any limit to the length of time a state may deprive an
individual of his liberty.
Certainly, it can be difficult to identify objective and predictable
criteria to define proportionality of punishment. 15 Nonetheless, once the
Court has decided to evaluate some forms of punishment, namely
monetary, no justification truly exists for excluding other types of
punishment. Furthermore, the relevant jurisprudence has identified factors
at the heart of proportionality review. These include the gravity of the
offense, the defendant's culpabilitr6 an intra-jurisdictional comparison, and
an inter-jurisdictional comparison.
REV. 1161, 1167 (2001) [hereinafter Latzer, Proportionality Review]. For further discussion of this
issue, see generally Evan 1. Mandery, In Defense of Specific Proportionality Review, 65 ALB. L. REV.
883 (2002) (challenging the arguments made by Professor Latzer) and Barry Latzer, A Reply to
Professor Mandery, 65 ALB. L. REV. 935 (2002).
II State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003). The Utah Supreme Court
held that a trial court committed reversible error when it ordered a remittitur of the punitive damages
award to $25 million. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89 (2001).
12 Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003); Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003).
I) Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
14 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Michigan
determined that the statute at issue in Harmelin violated the state constitution. People v. Bullock, 485
N.W.2d 866, 878 (1992).
15 See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov, Predictably Incoherent
Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1167 (2002) (noting that in the context of jury determinations of
punitive damages awards, identifying "the translation problem" as the difficulty in equating the punitive
intent of the jury with a "scale that can be used by the legal system, such as dollars of fines or months in
jail").
16 Solem, 463 U.S. at 292 (1983).
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In the 2002-2003 Supreme Court Term, the Court had an opportunity
to set out a meaningful method for evaluating the proportionality of prison
sentences that is consistent with its approach to punitive damages awards
and forfeitures. Specifically, the Court has agreed to hear two cases
involving severe sentences under California's Three Strikes Law. Gary
Ewing was sentenced to life without the possibili~ of parole for twenty-
five years for attempting to steal three golf clubs, I and Leandro Andrade
received a life sentence without the possibility of parole for fifty years for
shoplifting a total of nine videotapes on two occasions. 18 Both defendants
received these sentences because they had prior convictions. 19 Otherwise,
these offenses would constitute petty theft, a misdemeanor, and would
carry maximum sentences of six months in jail under California law.20
As to the Ewing case, the California Supreme Court declined to review
the sentence;21 in the Andrade case, the Ninth Circuit held that Andrade's
sentence was disproportionate to the crimes involved and, therefore,
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment.22 The Supreme Court upheld these sentences. If the Supreme
Court had begun to take proportionality review in the context of terms of
imprisonment as seriously as it takes such review of punitive damages
awards and forfeitures, it might have affirmed the Ninth Circuit.23 This
17 Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1190 (2003) (No. 01-6978),
available at 2003 WL 728753. Ewing was convicted of one count of grand theft of personal property.
Ewing, 123 S. Ct. 1184.
18 Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1169-70 (2003).
191d. at 1170; Ewing, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1190 (2003).
20 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17,666 (WEST 2003).
21 People v. Ewing, 2001 Cal. LEXIS 4704 (Cal. July 11,2001).
22 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 743. Another Ninth Circuit panel reversed sentences in two consolidated
cases under the same law. In Brown v. California, 283 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2002), the court found that
sentences of life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years imposed on Earnest Bray, Jr. for
attempting to steal three videotapes, and on Napoleon Brown for attempting to steal a steering wheel
alarm were unconstitutional. The two Ninth Circuit panels were careful to point out that their opinions
did not invalidate California's Three Strikes law. Rather, their holdings were "limited to the application
of the Three Strikes law to the unusual circumstances of [the] case[s]." Andrade, 270 F.3d at 767;
Brown, 283 F.3d at 1040 ("Our decision does not hold the California Three Strikes Law
unconstitutional, only its application to mandate a 25-year-to-life sentence for a petty theft offense such
as those in these cases.").
23 Following the recent case, Newdow v. United States Cong., 2002 U.S. LEXIS 12826 (9th Cir.),
involving the "under God" language in the Pledge of Allegiance, numerous periodicals have reported on
the reversal record of Ninth Circuit cases by the United States Supreme Court. Jason Hoppin, Courting
Controversy, THE RECORDER, June 28, 2002, at I ("As many national news stories [after the Newdow]
decision pointed out, the [Ninth] Circuit is overturned more often than any other circuit"); Marisa
Taylor, Influential 9th Circuit Assembles in S.D.-Weighty Issues are on Agenda for Judges Who DefY
Consensus, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 15,2002, at Al (pointing out that "[b]y 1997, the 9th
[Circuit] had the nation's worst record: 28 out of29 cases reviewed were reversed," but also noting that
the "reversal rate last year was 71 percent, which is about the national average"). But see Faith
Bremner, Democrats Say Bill s New Momentum Based on Court:v Pledge of Allegiance Ruling,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, July 24, 2002 (discussing legislation that would split the Ninth Circuit into
two circuits, and quoting Ninth Circuit Judge, Sidney R. Thomas, as follows: "Last year, the high court
reversed all of the decisions that it agreed to hear from the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and II th circuits, ... [a]lthough
the Supreme Court reversed 78 percent of the 9th circuit's decisions last year, it reversed 89 percent of
the 6th circuit's decisions").
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would have resulted in more meaningful scrutiny of terms of imprisonment
and provided a check on the imposition of sometimes draconian criminal
sanctions/4 particularly under three strikes legislation. This missed
opportunity is further highlighted by the fact that only one month after
upholding the life sentences in Andrade and Ewing, the Court found a
monetary sanction unconstitutional in State Farm.
Part I of this Article reviews the case law regarding judicial review of
both terms of imprisonment and imposition of the death penalty. In this
section, I argue for consistency within this area of the law. Some
jurisprudence suggests that, because "death is different," proportionality
review is appropriate only in the death penalty context, and is either not
required or only applies in an extremely narrow example, such as life
imprisonment for a parking ticket.25 Part II examines Supreme Court
precedent that analyzes the question of proportionality of forfeitures and
punitive damages awards. In the context of forfeitures, the debate centers
primarily on the question of how broadly a court should apply the
Excessive Fines Clause. Nonetheless, the relevant cases provide insight
about the appropriate criteria for proportionality review. The much shorter
history of proportionality review of punitive damages awards also speaks to
the question of how to evaluate punishments for excessiveness. Part III of
this Article discusses Andrade, Ewing, and State Farm, all decided during
the 2002-2003 term. Finally, I argue that the Court should apply the same
criteria to all these forms of punishment to achieve a greater degree of
• 26
consIstency.
24 See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Juslice: The Federalizalion of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 643, n.I28 (1997) (stating that state law is less favorable to criminal defendants than federal law
and "perhaps the most noteworthy example is California's 'three strikes and you're out' statute,
requiring draconian sentences for recidivist felons"); Nina Totenberg, Morning Edilion (National Public
Radio Broadcast, Oct. 7,2002) (describing California's Three Strikes law as "the most Draconian such
law in the country"); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Tavis Smiley (National Public Radio Broadcast,
Nov. 6, 2002) (stating that California's Three Strikes law is "more harsh" than three strikes laws in
other states).
25 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.II (1980) (discussing this example, with the
implication that such a sentence would be unconstitutional).
21> Scholars have compared the Court's approach to punitive damages with that of capital
punishment, see, e.g., Steven Semeraro, Responsibilily in Capilal Senlencing, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
79, 144 (2002) ("The Court's treatment of punitive damages perhaps most closely mirrors the
development of modern capital punishment doctrine"), and with other criminal punishments, see e.g.,
Adam M. Gershowitz, The Supreme Courl:~ Backwards Proporlionalily Jurispnldence: Comparing
Judicial Review (~r Excessive Criminal Punishmenls and Excessive Punilive Damages Awards, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1249, 1302 (2000) (concluding that "[t]he Supreme Court must reconsider its decisions
affording more rigorous proportionality review to excessive punitive damages awards than to excessive
criminal punishments"). There is also a comparison of proportionality review of criminal punishments
and that of forfeitures. See, e.g., Barry L. Johnson, Purging Ihe Cmel and Unusual: The AlIIonomous
Excessive Fines Clause and Deserl-Based Conslillllional Limils on Foifeilures After United States v.
Bajakajian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 461, 503 (arguing that the Court in Bajakajian adopted a standard of
excessiveness for forfeitures very similar to that used to review criminal punishments, amounting "to
complete judicial abdication of meaningful proportionality review"). Another scholar has compared
review of punitive damages awards to that of forfeitures. Susan R. Klein, The DiscriminalolJ'
Applicalion of Subslanlive Due Process: A Tale of Two Vehicles, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 453 (1997)
(specifically comparing the forfeiture of a jointly owned car due to the criminal activity of one co-
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The Supreme Court has often acknowledged the ambiguity of the
meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. "[D]ifficulty would
attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional
provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be
inflicted."n Interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of
the Eighth Amendment can, nonetheless, be separated into three primary
areas. First, there is jurisprudence that focuses on the modes or methods of
punishment.28 This was the main focus of the Court's analysis of the
punishment of denationalization in Trop v. Dulles.29 The Court stated:
While the state has the power to punish, the [Eighth] Amendment stands
to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized
standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed
depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the
bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect.30
The Court ultimately concluded that the Eighth Amendment bars
denationalization as a punishment.31 The scope of this analysis also
includes cases involving methods of execution.32
The second set of case law involves the procedural safeguards to the
imposition of punishment. In the context of the death penalty, this has been
of central concern to a majority of the Supreme Court Justices who have
owner in Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996), and the punitive damages award in BMW of North
America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559». However, there is no in-depth study comparing all four areas: capital
punishment, tenns of imprisonment, punitive damages and forfeitures. .
27 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878). See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,99 ("The
exact scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by this Court.");
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) ("What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment has
not been exactly decided.").
28 This area of jurisprudence is also referred to as involving the issue of "decency" to contrast it
with the third area this article examines regarding proportionality. See Herbert L. Packer, Making the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1075-76 (1964) (describing Weems v. United States
as speaking "to the issue of decency, not rationality").
29 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
30 Id. at 100.
31 Id. at 101 ("It is a fonn of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the
individual the political existence that was centuries in the development."). In Weems, the Court's
analysis did not distinguish between the types of penalties applied and the duration, fifteen years, of the
sentence. In fact, the Court concluded that it lacked power to separate the penalties. Weems, 217 U.S.
at 382.
32 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1889) (execution by electrocution held constitutional); Wilkerson,
99 U.S. 130 (1878) (execution by firing squad upheld in dicta). For a detailed discussion of the
jurisprudence surrounding the issue of modes of execution, see generally, Roberta M. Harding, The
Gallows to the Gurney: Analyzing the (Un)constitutionality of the Methods of Execution, 6 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 153 (1996); Deborah Denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method ofExecution? The
Engineering ofDeath Over the Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551 (Winter 1994); Dawn Macready,
Student Article, The "Shocking" Truth About the Electric Chair: An Analysis ofthe Unconstitutionality
ofElectrocution, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 781 (2000). Despite the holding in Kemmler, only a few states
currently allow for death by electrocution. See. e.g., Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137 (2001) (finding
execution by electrocution violative of Georgia's constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment).
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considered it. In Gregg v. Georgia,33 the Court discussed the concern
raised by at least three Justices in Furman v. Georgia34-that death "not be.
imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it
would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.,,35 In Lockett v.
Ohio,36 the Court disapproved a scheme that limited the mitigating
circumstances on which a defendant could present evidence in the
sentencing phase. The Court held that before imposing the death penalty,
the state must allow consideration of "[every] aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense" that the
defendant offers as mitigatin~.37 The .procedural safeguards issue also
arose in Ford v. Wainwright/ where the Court held that the execution of
insane defendants violated the Eighth Amendment, in part because the
state's procedural scheme did not 9ive the defendant an adequate
opportunity to present an insanity claim. 9 Procedural safeguards related to
the imposition of the death penalty are not limited to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. Most recently, the Supreme Court
found that a state sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial by allowin§ a judge to determine facts supporting the imposition
of the death penalty.4 The Court has held that this procedural protection
also applies to enhanced prison sentences.4\
Third, the Supreme Court has developed a jurisprudence of substantive
proportionality with respect to both the death penalty and to terms of
imprisonment. To this I now tum.
A. DOES "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL" INCLUDE PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW?
The threshold question of controversy is whether the Eighth
Amendment's "Cruel and Unusual" language includes a proportionality
principle at all; that is, does this part of the Eighth Amendment impose a
limit on disproportional or excessive sentences? It seems that at least six
33428 U.s. 153 (1976).
34 408 U.s. 238 (1972).
35 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.
36 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
37/d. at 604. See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (striking a sentencing
scheme that mandated the death penalty for every person convicted of first degree murder stating, the
"relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender" must be considered).
38 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
39/d.at414.
40 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). A majority of the Court in Ring overruled Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), which had upheld the same scheme. The Court determined that the
scheme was not reconcilable with the recent case, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), "which
held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be 'exposed ... to a penalty exceeding
the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.'"
Ring, 536 U.s. at 588 (2002) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483).
41 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466 (2000) (finding that a jury must determine whether the defendant's
conduct came within the state's hate crime law to justify an increase in the maximum prison sentence).
Bur see Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 560 (2002) (the factual determination of whether the
defendant "brandished" a weapon to justify an increase in his sentence did not constitute an element of
the offense and could be found by a judge as sentencing factor).
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Justices currently on the Court support the view that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause includes a principle of proportionality, though they may
not agree on the precise contours of such a principle. In Harmelin v.
Michigan, Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justices
O'Connor and Souter. Justice Kennedy eschewed the historical approach
taken in Justice Scalia's opinion and opted to respect the proportionality
jurisprudence that has developed over the last century. Justice Kennedy
stated that "stare decisis counsels our adherence to the narrow
proportionality principle that has existed in our Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence for 80 years.''''2 The dissenting Justices in Harmelin agreed
that the Eighth Amendment imposes a proportionality requirement for
criminal sentences, but they applied a different standard and believed that
the punishment was unconstitutionally excessive under the facts of the
case. The dissenters accused Justice Kennedy of unduly narrowing
proportionality review by collapsing the factors developed in cases like
Solem v. Helm.43 Of those dissenting Justices, only Justice Stevens still sits
on the Court.44
As to the Justices appointed since Harmelin,45 Justice Thomas seems to
agree with Justice Scalia's view that there is no proportionality guarantee as
to criminal punishment. Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion in Atkins v. Virginia.46 In addition, both Justices wrote concurring
opinions in Ewing clearly stating that they do not believe that the Eighth
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause contains a
proportionality principle.47 Justices Breyer and Ginsburg joined the
majority opinion in the recent Atkins case where the Court held that "death
is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal" because it is
excessive.48 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, further observed, "we
have read the text of the [Eighth A]mendment to prohibit all excessive
punishments, as well as cruel and unusual punishments that mayor may not
be excessive.''''9 Before joining the dissents in Andrade and Ewing,
Justices Breyer and Ginsbur~ indicated that they support proportionality
review in Riggs v. California. 0 In Riggs, as in the Andrade case, the trial
court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility
42 Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991).
43 463 U.S. 277 (1983). See also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1018. (White, J., dissenting) ("While
Justice Scalia seeks to deliver a swift death sentence to Solem, Justice Kennedy prefers to eviscerate it,
leaving only an empty shell."). In Solem, the Court held that a life sentence for writing a no account
check in the amount of$IOO was unconstitutionally excessive. 463 U.S. at 303.
44 Justice Thurgood Marshall retired on June 17, 1991; Justice Byron R. White retired on June 28,
1993; Justice Harry A. Blackmun retired on June 30, 1994. Legal Information Institute, Historic
Supreme Court Decisions-by Justice, at http://supct.law.comell.edu/supct/cases/judges.htm (last
visited Apr. 10,2003).
45 Justice Clarence Thomas was appointed on. October 23, 1991; Ruth Bader Ginsburg was
appointed on August 10, 1993; Justice Stephen Breyer was appointed on August 3, 1994. /d.
46 536 U.S. 304 (2002). .
47 Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1190-91 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring, and Thomas, 1.,
concurring).
4R /d. at 321.
49/d. at 311 n.7.
50 525 U.S. 1114 (1999).
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of parole for twenty-five years for a petty theft offense.51 The Supreme
Court denied certiorari in Riggs, but Justice Ginsburg joined a short opinion
by Justice Stevens.52 Justice Stevens indicated that the aspect of
California's Three Strikes law at issue presented substantial constitutional
concerns, particularly "when the state 'double counts' the defendant's
recidivism in the course of imposing ... punishment.,,53 However, Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter decided to defer Supreme Court review of
this issue until other courts, such as the California Supreme Court or
federal district and appellate courts, had entered the discussion. Justice
Breyer dissented from the denial of certiorari, stating that the petition
"raises a serious question concerning the application of a 'three-strikes' law
to what is in essence a petty offense. ,,54 In Durden v. California, Justice
Souter wrote a dissent to the denial of certiorari, in which Justice Breyer
joined.55 Similar to the defendants in the other three strikes cases cited, Mr.
Durden received a life sentence with the possibility of parole in twenty-five
years for a petty theft of merchandise worth forty-three dollars.56 Both the
Ewing and Andrade decisions confirm that terms of imprisonment are
subject to a proportionality limitation, even if the State of California did not
violate this principle. Thus, as to the issue of whether the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause contains a proportionality limitation, death is
not different; a majority of the current Court and past Courts agree that
whether the punishment is the sentence of death or life without the
possibility of parole for a non-violent felony,57 the Eighth Amendment
prohibits disproportionate criminal sentences.
Two current Supreme Court Justices believe that the Cruel and Unusual
language of the Eighth Amendment does not include such a limitation.58
Most recently, Justice Thomas tersely concluded "the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality
principle."59 Justice Scalia elaborated on this conclusion in Atkins v.
Virginia,6o arguing that the cruel and unusual language of the Eighth
Amendment does not include a proportionality principle because there is no
SlId. at 1114-15.
52 See id. (sentencing the defendant to life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years
for stealing a bottle of vitamins from a supermarket).
53 Id. at 1116. The characterization of "double counting" is based on the fact that under California
law, when a defendant has been convicted of certain offenses, a prosecutor is permitted to treat what
would otherwise be a misdemeanor as a felony (this is the first time the defendant's recidivism is
considered). Then, under the Three Strikes law, where the "bumped up" misdemeanor is the
defendant's third felony, she is subject to the mandatory sentence oflife without the possibility of parole
for twenty-five years (the second time the defendant's recidivism is counted). Thus recidivism is
counted twice-once to bump the misdemeanor up to a felony and again to subject the defendant to the
mandatory sentence under the Three Strikes law.
541d. at 1114 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
55531 U.S. 1184 (2001).
56/d. at 1184.
57 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). Discussed il!!ra Part l.A.
5R Scholars have considered the original understanding and the history of the Eighth Amendment,
and I do not plan to enter into that debate.
59 Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1191 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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. textual or historical support for such a principle.61 Similarly, Justice
Scalia's opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan62 included an extensive historical
analysis to support the conclusion that the term "cruel and unusual" meant
to prohibit only certain modes of punishment considered to be barbarous.63
Chief Justice Rehnquist's position on the issue has varied somewhat. He
joined Justice Scalia in Harmelin, but he did not join Scalia's dissent in
Atkins, nor did he state that the Eighth Amendment does not include a
principle of proportionalit:x.64 In addition, writing for the majority in
Alexander v. United States,65 the Chief Justice stated that the "Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause . . . is concerned with matters such as the
duration or conditions of confinement.,,66 Also, before Harmelin, the Chief
Justice wrote for the majority in Rummel v. Estelle,67 concluding that the
life sentence was not unconstitutiona1.68 Nonetheless, he also stated, "[t]his
is not to say that a proportionality principle would not come into play in the
extreme example . . . if the legislature made overtime parking a felony
punishable by life imprisonment.,,69 More recently, in Ewing, Chief Justice
Rehnquist did not join in the concurring opinions of Thomas and Scalia,
which concluded that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not
contain a proportionality principle. While the Chief Justice's conception of
a proportionality principle may be exceedingly narrow despite the fact he
joined Justice Scalia's opinion in Harmelin, the Chief Justice Rehnquist
seems to have accepted proportionality, at least in principle.
Moreover, Justice Scalia's narrow interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause has little precedential
support. As early as 1892, members of the Supreme Court expressed the
view that some criminal sentences could be unconstitutionally excessive.
In 0 'Neil v. Vermont,70 Justice Field argued that this clause was directed
"against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are
greatly disproportionate to the offenses charged. The whole inhibition [of
61 Id. at 337-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (affirming a life sentence without the possibility of parole for the first-time
offense of marijuana possession is not cruel and unusual punishment).
63 See id. at 979-86. Justice White disputed this historical analysis. ld. at 1009-14 (White, J.,
dissenting).
64 The focus of Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Atkins was his disagreement with the
majority's reliance on "foreign laws, the views of professional and religious organizations, and opinion
polls" in determining whether this is evidence of a national consensus as to the imposition of the death
penalty on retarded criminals. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322.
65 509 U.S. 544 (1993) (a forfeiture case in which the Court remanded for a determination as to
whether forfeiture of the defendant's businesses and nearly nine million dollars acquired through
racketeering activities was excessive).
661d. at 558 (emphasis added).
67 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
68 Id. at 264, 285.
69 ld. at 274 n.ll. See also David S. Mackey, Rationality Versus Proportionality: Reconsidering
the Constitutional Limits on Criminal Sanctions, 51 TENN. L. REV. 623, 630 (1984) ("elements of the
Rehnquist opinion [in Rummel] suggested that the proportionality criteria did survive Rummer).
70 144 U.S. 323, 338 (1892) (sentencing the defendant to fifty-four years imprisonment after a
Vermont conviction for "selling, furnishing and giving away ... intoxicating liquor, which took place in
New York, to be delivered in Vermont") (Field, J., dissenting).
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the Eighth Amendment] is against that which is excessive either in the bail
required, or the fine imposed, or punishment inflicted.,,71 Furthermore, a
majority of the Court in Weems v. United States72 concluded that the
drafters' intent and the history of the Eighth Amendment did not clarify the
scope of the language.73 Rather, the Court considered the impulse for such
a provision, namely distrust of power and the insistence "on constitutional
limitations against its abuse.,,7 The Court also considered the general
language used in the Eighth Amendment and concluded that this did not
support a narrow meaning.
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be
necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth. This is particularly true of constitutions.
They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions.
They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to
approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.',75
Further acknowledging the changing nature of the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court
in Trap v. Dulles,? stated that, "[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning
71 Id. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The majority in O'Neil only briefly
discussed the Eighth Amendment argument, holding that there was no federal question, but rather an
issue under the Vermont Constitution. In Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment only limited the federal government and was not applicable to the states.
Subsequently, in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court incorporated the Eighth
Amendment into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, making it applicable to the
states.
72 217 U.S. 349, 364 (1910). The defendant was convicted of falsifying a public and official
document and received the jurisdiction's third harshest sentence, cadena temporal, a sentence of twelve
years and one day to twenty-one years imprisonment. The Court described this punishment as follows:
"[T]hose sentenced to cadena temporal . .. shall labor for the benefit of the state. They shall
always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrists; . . . and shall receive no
assistance whatsoever from without the institution." ... There are, besides, certain accessory
penalties imposed ....
Id. The accessory penalties included deprivation of the rights of parental authority, guardianship of
person, marital authority, subjection to surveillance during the defendant's lifetime, deprivation of the
right to vote, or to be elected to public office and the loss of retirement pay. Id. at 364-65. After
engaging in a comparative analysis of offenses in other jurisdictions as well as in the jurisdiction at
issue, the Court concluded that the sentence was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. Id. at 381.
73 See generally id.
741d. at 372.
751d. at 373. Herbert Packer questions the "conventional view" that Weems represents the Court's
acceptance of a proportionality principle that assesses the length of a prison sentence. Instead,
Professor Packer asserts that Weems is really a ease about the mode or method of punishment. Packer,
supra note 28, at 1075. Nonetheless, in Weems, the Court did not distinguish between the fifteen-year
sentence and the "accessories." E.g., 217 U.S. at 358, 381. Indeed, the Court specifically compared the
fifteen years to the two years the defendant could have received under United States federal law. Id. at
380.
76 356 U.S. 86 (1958). The defendant was convicted by court-martial of wartime desertion, and
sentenced to three years hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances and dishonorable discharge. Id.
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from the evolvin~ standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." 7 Although the Court upheld the death sentence in
Gregg v. Georgia,78 it stated that the Eighth Amendment required that
"punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.,,79 This limitation focuses on the type or method of punishment
imposed.80 "Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion
to the severity of the crime.,,81 This once again emphasizes a
proportionality principle.82
B. THE SCOPE OF PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
The next step in Eighth Amendment analysis is to determine what
standard is appropriate for assessing the possible excessiveness or
disproportionality of a criminal punishment.83 The Supreme Court has
been unable to construct a method for evaluating proportionality that
commands a consistent majority of Justices. This tension is based on
fundamental disagreements about the proper role of the Court, as well as a
concern of some Justices that any standard will necessarily reflect the
subjective views of individual Justices.84 This tension has resulted in
different approaches. Some Justices concede a proportionality principle but
find that it applies only to capital punishment,85 or to both capital
punishment and extreme terms of imprisonment, such as a life sentence for
at 87-88. Eight years later, the defendant discovered that the conviction had also resulted in his loss of
citizenship. Id. at 88. The Court concluded that denationalization in this context constituted a criminal
penalty and that this type of punishment was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. Id. at 97-99, 100-
03.
77 Id. at 10 I.
78 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (finding that the procedures used in imposing the death penalty adequately
guided the jury's discretion by requiring the jury to consider statutory aggravating circumstances and
any relevant mitigating circumstances). Accord Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976). But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)
(three Justices found that the procedures used by Georgia for imposing the death penalty provided "no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not").
79 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
80 See supra note 63 and accompanying text regarding the modes of punishment.
81 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
82 The Court reaffirmed this view in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (noting that in
Gregg, the Court "firmly embraced the holdings and dicta from prior cases, ... to the effect that the
Eighth Amendment bars not only those punishments that are 'barbaric' but also those that are
'excessive' in relation to the crime committed").
83 This Article focuses only on the following types of "punishments": the death penalty, terms of
imprisonment, forfeitures, and punitive damages awards. See Thomas K. Landry, "Punishment" and
the Eighth Amendment, 57 OHIO ST. LJ. 1607 (1996) for a discussion offorms of punishment endured
by prisoners.
84 See Allyn G. Heald, Criminal Law: United States v. Gonzalez: In Search of a Meaningfitl
Proportionality Principle, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 455, 457 (1992) ("[I]t is argued that courts will be left to
impose their subjective views of whether a punishment is proportional to its crime-leading to the
accusation that courts are overstepping their bounds by substituting their judgment for that of the
legislature.").
85 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (Scalia distinguishing Coker). BlIt see Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337-54 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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overtime parking.86 For clarity and simplicity, I will refer to these as the
"no proportionality" approaches. The problem with these approaches is
that no explanation exists as to why these examples should receive different
treatment than other sentences of imprisonment. The phrase "death is
different" is often used by the proponents of these approaches as a way to
limit proportionality review to capital punishment, but this is not
convincing.87 First, nothing in the Eighth Amendment indicates that its
application is limited to the punishment of death. Second, the fact that the
punishment at issue is a term of imprisonment rather than a death sentence
does not, in and of itself, make the punishment proportionate. Rather, the
nature of the punishment is merely one factor a court should consider when
reviewing a punishment for proportionality.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin sets out another
approach that does not meaningfully contribute to this analysis. Under this
proportionality approach, the Court is to consider the gravity of the offense
and the sentence imposed, and then decide whether the sentence is grossly
disproportionate as a threshold matter. Only if this threshold inquiry results
in a finding of gross disproportionality is the Court to engage in a
comparative analysis of sentences.88 I refer to this as the "Harmelin"
approach. Commentators have indicated that the "Harmelin" and "no
proportionality" approaches essentially lack proportionality review at all.89
In addition, to the extent that Justices are concerned with the possibility of
subjectivity in any proportionality review, the "Harmelin" approach is as
subjective as one could get. As discussed in more detail below, the
threshold inquiry of the "Harmelin" approach seems to require a type of
judicial gut reaction to the punishment itself.
The final approach is to attempt some level of objectivity by setting out
criteria to examine in each case, the "Solem" approach. This approach
includes a comparison of how other jurisdictions punish particular offenses,
or particular defendants, how the specific jurisdiction involved punishes
other offenses, and a comparison of the offense with the punishment to
determine whether the punishment furthers recognized purposes of
punishment.90 This test has been used in both death penalty cases and those
86 This example is posed in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
and acknowledged as disproportionate by the majority in the same case. ld. at 274 n.11 ("This is not to
say that a proportionality principle would not come into play in the extreme example mentioned by the
dissent ....").
87 Harmelin, 50 I U.S. at 994 ("Proportionality review is one of several respects in which we have
held that 'death is different,' and have imposed protections that the Constitution nowhere else provides
... We [Justices Scalia and Rehnquist] would leave it there, but will not extend it further.") (citations
omitted).
881d. at 996. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
89 See Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive
Penalties, 144 U, PA. L. REV. 101, 152-53 (1995) (stating that if the "Court were to limit
proportionality review [as Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist urge], the bulk of the sanctions
imposed in this country would escape review entirely"). See also Johnson, supra note 26, at 503.
90 See generally Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle. 445 U.S. 263 (1980)
(Powell, J. dissenting).
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involving imprisonment. Meaningful proportionality review of criminal
sentences requires adherence to the "Solem" approach.
As a general proposition, proportionality involves a determination of
whether the "punishment fits the crime.'>91 This section will attempt to
unpack these four words in an effort to discern their meaning. An
examination of the cases in this area reveals five primary considerations the
Court takes into account in assessing whether a punishment is
unconstitutionally excessive. However, it is not always clear which of
these considerations will dominate in a given case, or even whether the
court can consider them in isolation.92 In fact, these factors often over1a~.
Thus, I set them out mainly as a method of organizing the jurisprudence. 3
These considerations are: First, the nature of the offense in the abstract
compared to the specific punishment.94 Second is the nature or status of the
defendant in the abstract compared to the punishment imposed;95 that is,
does the defendant belong to a class of people upon whom the specific
punishment should not be imposed? The third consideration is the
individual defendant's culpability as compared to the sentence; that is, the
Court examines the specific conduct of the defendant and considers
whether this conduct merits the punishment imposed.96 Finally, in focusing
on the severi~ of the specific punishment, the Court often engages in inter-
jurisdictional and intra-jurisdictional98 comparative analyses.
91 See. e.g., Packer, supra note 28.
92 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 291 n.17 ([N]o single criterion can identify when a sentence is so grossly
disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment. ... But a combination of objective factors can
make such analysis possible."); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 299 n.19 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The relevant
objective factors should be considered together and, although the weight assigned to each may vary, no
single factor will ever be controlling.").
93 For an example of organizing case-by-case, see Kathi A. Drew & R. K. Weaver,
Disproportionate or Excessive Punishments: Is There a Method for Successful Constitutional
Challenges?, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1 (1995).
94 The Court identified this as one "objective factor" in Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91 ("we look to
the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty"). The plurality in Harmelin identified this
consideration as the start of the analysis, and the end if the Court determines that the sentence is not
"grossly disproportionate."
95 The Court has not expressly identified this as a factor to consider in assessing proportionality of
punishments, but it is one that emerges from the case law. See infra Part 1.8.2.
96 Case law indicates that the Court has not separated this out as a factor, but considers the
defendant's individual culpability within the criterion involving the gravity of the offense. 1 think it is
helpful to distinguish between the nature of the offense in the abstract and the defendant's individual
culpability. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The inquiry [of proportionality]
focuses on whether a person deserves such punishment, not simply on whether punishment would serve
a utilitarian goal.") (emphasis added). See also Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital
Sentencing: The Supreme Court s Tor/llred Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 Ky. L.J.
107, 168 (1996) (recognizing the necessity of considering both retributive and utilitarian theories of
punishment, but proposing an approach of "limiting retributivism" as a way to limit "the severity of ...
sentences consistent with the notion that no sentence can be grossly disproportional to the crime which
it seeks to punish").
97 See Solem, 463 U.S. at 291 ("courts may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions").
98 See id. ("[I]t may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction. If more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is
some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive.").
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Accordingly, the Court asks two questions: what punishments are imposed
for similar offenses in other jurisdictions, and what punishments does the
relevant jurisdiction impose for more serious offenses? The first two
considerations often result in bright-line rules.
1. The Nature ofthe Offense
As to the nature of the offense in the abstract (that is, without regard to
the individual defendant's culpability), the Court held in Coker v. Georgia99
that a death penalty sentence for the rape of an adult woman is an
unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment, in part because "the rapist
... does not take human life."'oo Similarly, in Enmund v. Florida, 10 I the
Court held that the state could not impose the death penalty on a defendant
who had been convicted of felony murder, but had not killed, attempted to
kill, or intended to kill. In Enmund, the defendant participated in the
underlying felony of armed robbery b~ driving the getaway car, but had not
"actively" participated in the killing. 02 While the Court was concerned
with the individual culpability of the defendant in Enmund, this seemed to
overlap with the abstract notion of using the felony murder rule to support a
death sentence. In both Coker and Enmund, the Court wondered whether
imposing the death penalty in those t~pes of cases would further any of the
accepted purposes of punishment. 0 The Court has considered the
seriousness of the crime in evaluating other criminal sanctions as well. In
Weems v. United States I04 the Court emphasized the fact that the offense of
falsifying a public and official document did not require the showing of
fraud or even intent to defraud, but nonetheless allowed for a severe
punishment. 105 The Court suggested that the harsh punishment imposed for
the defendant's crime exceeded the purposes of punishment. 106 The Court
99 433 U.s. 584 (1977). There were hinls that the some Justices were concerned about the
imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape. In Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963)
(Goldberg, 1., dissenting from denial of certiorari), three Justices articulate a considerations very similar
to those that prevailed in Coker. See also Packer, supra note 28, at 1072-73.
100 Coker, 433 U.S. at 598. The Court's analysis in Coker overlaps with the intra-jurisdictional
factor because the Court compared the imposition of the death penalty for rape to use of the same
penalty for premeditated murder in Georgia. The Court noted that even as to a deliberate killing, a jury
could impose the death penalty only upon an additional factual finding that aggravating circumstances
existed. The Court concluded "it is difficult to accept the notion, and we do not, that the rapist, with or
without aggravating circumstances, should be punished more heavily than the deliberate killer." Id. at
600.
101 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
102 But see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 147 (1987) (upholding imposition of the death penalty
where the state required the finding of an aggravating factor "beyond the fact that the killing had
occurred during the course of a felony").
103 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 ("Unless the death penalty when applied to those in Enmund's
position measurably contributes to one or both [goals of punishment) it 'is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering' and hence an unconstitutional punishment."
(quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592)). The goals typically identified by the Court are retribution and
deterrence. See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Coker, 433 U.S. 584.
104 217 U.S. 349 (1910). See supra note 72, for further discussion of this case.
105 Id. at 380-81.
106 Id.
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stated, "[t]he purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by
penalties of just, not tormenting, severity, its repetition is .prevented, and
hope is given for the reformation of the criminal."lo The Court
characterized the punishment's length, as well as the additional
"accessories," as an exercise of "unrestrained power"I08 and as
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. 109 On the other hand, in Harmelin,
Justice Kennedy's opinion devoted considerable attention to the gravity of
the drug possession crime for which the defendant was convicted. llo
Justice Kennedy pointed out that the amount of drugs possessed by the
defendant could produce between 32,500 and 65,000 doses and emphasized
that possession of such a large amount of drugs "threatened to cause grave
harm to society.,,111 Thus, the sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibiliW of parole was not "grossly disproportionate" to the serious drug
offense. I As to the goals served by such a harsh punishment, Justice
Kennedy concluded that the state legislature could determine that
possession of that amount of cocaine "is momentous enough to warrant the
deterrence and retribution of a life sentence without parole.,,113 Thus,
Justice Kennedy did not evaluate whether such a sentence would, in fact,
serve these ~oals, but deferred this issue to a possible legislative
determination. 14 The Court also examined the nature of the offense in
Robinson v. California. 115 Robinson held that it is cruel and unusual to
punish a person for being "addicted to the use of narcotics.,,116 As to the
107/d. at 381.
108 /d.
109 See generally id.
110 Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in Harmelin is considered controlling. See. e.g., Andrade
v. California, 270 F.3d 743, 754 ("Our circuit and others regard Justice Kennedy's test as 'the rule of
Harmelin' because it is the 'position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the
narrowest grounds'" (quoting United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1992» (other
citations omitted). See also Steven F. Poe, Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: The
Constitutional Mandate of Proportionality in Punishment in the Wake of Austin v. United States, 70
CHI-KENT L. REv. 237, 251 (1994) (describing a Fifth Circuit opinion as "[t]he most widely adopted
interpretation of the Harmelin opinion among the Circuit Courts of Appeals").
By applying a head-count analysis, we find that seven members of the Court supported a
continued Eighth Amendment guaranty against disproportional sentences. Only four
justices, however, supported the continued application of all three factors in Solem, and five
justices rejected it. Thus, this much is clear: disproportionality survives; Solem does not.
Only Justice Kennedy's opinion reflects that view. It is to his opinion, therefore, that we
turn for direction.
McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992). See also Gershowitz, supra note 26, at 1276-
1279 and accompanying footnotes for discussion of appellate courts application of Kennedy's Harmelin
opinion.
III 501 U.S. 957, 1002---{)3 (Kennedy, 1., concurring). The opinion also included statistics about
drug use generally and the link between illegal drugs and violent crime.
112 /d. at 996.
llJ /d.
114/d. ("the Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of anyone penological theory").
III 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
116/d. at 661, 667 (quoting Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11721). But see Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514 (1968) (limiting the application of Robinson to the narrow situation where a defendant is
punished solely on the basis of status).
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status of being a drug addict, or havin~ any other illness, "even one day in
prison would be cruel and unusual." 17 The fact that the criminal law
allowed conviction on the basis of the defendant's status overlaps with the
next factor involved in an evaluation of proportionality: where the
defendant belongs to a class of people for whom punishment may be
disproportionate.
2. The Status ofDefendants
The Supreme Court has drawn bright lines in holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of certain grou~s of people. These
groups include the insane,1I8 the mentally retarded, I and minors fifteen-
years old and younger. 120 In each of these cases, the Court has considered
whether the execution of individuals within these groups serves the
purposes of deterrence and retribution. In Ford v. Wainwright, 12 I the Court
emphasized the difficulty or even imfossibility of deterring an insane
person by imposing the death penalty. 12 In addition, the Court stated that
"retribution-the need to offset a criminal act by punishment of equivalent
moral quality-is not served by execution of an insane person, which has a
lesser value than that of the crime for which he is to be punished."123
Similarly, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court concluded that mentally retarded
criminals lack the level of culpabilitr necessary to advance the retributive
purpose served by the death penalty. 24 As to deterrence, the Court stated
that the "diminished ability to understand and process information . . .
make it less likely that [the mentally retarded] can process the information
of the possibility of execution as a penalty. ,,125
With respect to the execution of minors fifteen years old and younger,
the Thompson Court stated that it is unlikely that a child "has made the
kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of
117 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667. The concurring opinion raised the concern that punishing a drug
addict does not likely to serve the purpose of deterrence. Id. at 675 n.2 ("it is doubtful whether drug
addicts can be deterred from using drugs by threats of jailor prison sentences" (quoting Morris
Ploscowe, Appendix A: Some Basic Problems in Drug Addiction and Suggestions for Research, in JOINT
COMM. AM. BAR ASS'N AND AM. MED. ASS'N, DRUG ADDICTION: CRIME OR DISEASE? 15, 19-20
(1961».
118 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
119 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (abrogating Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989».
120 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989) (upholding imposition of death on minors sixteen or seventeen years old).
121 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
122 Id. at 408-10.
123 Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard & David W. Louisell, Death. the State. and
the Insane: Stay ofExecution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381,382 (1962».
124 But see Barry Latzer, Misplaced Compassion: The Mentally Retarded and the Death Penalty,
38 CRIM. L. BULL. 327, 346 (2002) (arguing that the notion that the mentally retarded are not
"deathworthy" is "totally at odds with one of the most fundamental precepts of death penalty
jurisprudence-the individualized sentencing requirement").
125 Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002). See also Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the
Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty. 52 ALA. L. REV. 911 (200 I) (discussing additional issues
faced by the mentally retarded in the criminal justice system).
2003] Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality 235
execution.,,126 The Court's analysis is an abstract one; it does not ask
whether the death penalty's purposes are served by executing the individual
defendants in these cases, but whether the execution of any member of
these groups furthers those purposes. Outside of the death penalty context,
Robinson stands for the proposition that any punishment for one's status as
an addict is unconstitutional. The majority opinion did not expressly state
that the purposes of retribution and deterrence would not be served, but the
concurring opinion mentions these as well as a consideration of the means
used to further the government's purpose.1 27 Thus, where a defendant is
insane, mentally retarded, or under sixteen years of age, a bright line rule
holds that the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional. In
addition, any punishment is unconstitutional when imposed based solely on
one's status as a drug addict.
By contrast, the status of being a habitual felon has resulted in another
seemingly bright line rule: no sentence of imprisonment, no matter how
long, is unconstitutional. This was the result in Rummel v. Estelle. 128 In
Rummel, the defendant received a life sentence under a recidivist statute
upon conviction of his third! triggering felony, a conviction for obtaining
$120.75 by false pretenses. 29 The two prior convictions involved the
fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or services and
the passing of a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Although the Court
did not expressly rely on Rummel's status as a habitual offender to uphold
the life sentence, it emphasized the importance of leaving such matters up
to state legislatures. "Like the line dividing felony theft from petty larceny,
the point at which a recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated the
necessary propensities and the amount of time that the recidivist will be
isolated from society are matters largely within the discretion of the
punishing jurisdiction.,,13o Therefore, the Rummel majority believed a
bright line rule allowing very severe sentences for recidivists, without
consideration of individual circumstances, was permissible. Only three
years later, the Court concluded that the fact of recidivism alone would not
necessarily deem a term of imprisonment constitutional. In Solem v.
Helm,13I the Court found a life sentence without the possibility of parole for
a seventh non-violent felony unconstitutionally excessive. The Court
recognized the state's interest in punishing a recidivist more harshly, but
stated that this status "cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior
offenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively minor. All were
126 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815, 837.
127 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("A prosecution for
addiction, with its resulting stigma and' irreparable damage to the good name of the accused, cannot be
justified as a means of protecting society, where a civil commitment would do as welL").
128 See 445 U.S. 263 (1980). See also discussion ofAndrade and Ewing infra Part 1Il.A.
129 The defendant accepted payment to repair an air conditioner, but did not fulfill his promise of
repairing it. See id. at 286 (Powell, J., dissenting). Under Texas law at the time, the offense constituted
a felony because the amount obtained was more than $50. See id. at 266.
130Id. at 285.
131 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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nonviolent and none was a crime against a person.,,132 According to the
Solem Court, the mere fact that the state classifies a defendant as a habitual
criminal is insufficient to justif~ its own harsh sentences, such as life
without the possibility of parole. I 3 Rather, this is one factor to consider in
addition to the nature of the offenses involved and the specific facts of the
defendant's conduct during the commission of the offenses. This overlaps
with the next consideration, because in addition to considering the
defendant's culpability with respect to the offense in question, the Court
may also consider the defendant's more general culpability and include the
defendant's criminal history when evaluating the sentence imposed.
3. The Defendant s Culpability
The third aspect that surfaces in a number of proportionality cases is
the consideration of the individual defendant's culpability. This factor
resembles the first, the examination of the gravity of the offense, but the
analysis here is more subjective; it is essentially a matter of what the
particular defendant did. The Court considered this in Enmund v. Florida,
when it emphasized the fact that the defendant drove the getaway car for a
planned armed robbery, but did not participate in the killing. 134 The Court
held that the defendant's participation in the robbery, when considered
separately, did not evince sufficient culpability for the death penalty.135
Similarly, in Godfrey v. Georgia,136 the Court set aside a death sentence on
the grounds that the defendant's crimes did not reflect "a consciousness
materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder.,,]3? In
contrast, a majority of the Court in Rummel did not accept the defendant's
argument that his offenses were not very serious simply because he did not
use violence or engage in other life-threatening behavior. 138 Furthermore,
the Court also rejected his argument that the offenses were trivial due to the
small sums of money involved. 139 The Court stated that "[h]aving twice
imprisoned [Rummel] for felonies, Texas was entitled to place upon [him]
the onus of one who is simply unable to bring his conduct within the social
132 Id. at 296-97.
133 The Court distinguished Solem from Rummel; based in part on the fact that the defendant in
Rummel was eligible for parole in twelve years. Id. at 297.
134 458 U.S. 782, 788 n.2, 798 (1982).
13l Id. at 798 ("The focus must be on his culpability, not on that of those who committed the
robbery and shot the victims, for we insist on 'individualized consideration as a constitutional
requirement in imposing the death sentence." (quoting Lockell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978»).
136 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
137/d. at 433.
138 The Court stated, "[T]he presence or absence of violence does not always affect the strength of
society's interest in deterring a particular crime or in punishing a particular criminal." 445 U.S. 263,
275 (1980).
13'! "[T]o recognize that the State of Texas could have imprisoned Rummel for life if he had stolen
$5,000, $50,000, or $500,000, rather than the $120.75 that a jury convicted him of stealing, is virtually
to concede that the lines to be drawn are indeed 'subjective,' and therefore properly within the province
of the legislatures, not courts." Id. at 275-76.
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nonns prescribed by the criminal law of the State.,,140 Thus, it seems that
in Rummel, the issue of whether a defendant deserves a harsh sentence is
not a consideration as long as the Court can identify a state interest to
justify such a harsh sentence.
The Rummel dissent, on the other hand, emphasized the need to
examine both the nature of the offenses and the facts involved, stating that
"[i]t is difficult to imagine felonies that pose less danger to the peace and
good order of a civilized society than the three crimes committed by
[Rummel]."141 This became the prevailing viewpoint only three years after
Rummel. In Solem, for example, the Court considered the nature of the
felonies that triggered the recidivist statute. Helm's prior felony
convictions were three third-degree burglaries, obtaining money by false
pretenses, grand larceny, and third-offense driving while intoxicated. The
seventh felony was for uttering a "no account" check for $100. 142 While
conceding that prior convictions are relevant to sentencing, the Court
stated, "[w]e must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers
the life sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his
prior offenses.,,143 Thus, in contrast to Rummel, the Court in Solem gave
less weight to the defendant's prior crimes and general culpability as a
habitual felon, though it did make note of the fact that Helm's criminal
record "involves no instance of violence of any kind.,,144
In addition to de-emphasizing general culpability, the Solem Court also
allowed for consideration of more subjective characteristics of the crime.
In setting out its analytical framework, the Court in Solem discussed the
"absolute magnitude of the crime" as a relevant consideration. 145 It
concluded that "[s]tealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious than
stealing a hundred dollars,,146 and should be treated accordingly.
Meanwhile, the Court in Rummel dismissed such distinctions as too
subjective. 147 Thus, Solem represents a retreat from the exceedingly narrow
view of proportionality review,148 and allows for consideration of the
defendant's individual culpability in addition to the nature of the offense,
without explicitly overruling Rummel.
Recidivism was not at issue in either Hutto v. Davis l49 or Harmelin v.
Michigan,150 yet they are important to consider because they bear upon the
140 Id. al 284. At another point in the opinion, the Court speaks of Rummel as one who is "simply
incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law." Id. at 276.
141 Id. at 296 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
142 Id. at 279-81.
143 Id. at 297 n.21.
144 Id. at 297 n.22.
1451d. at 293.
1461d.
147 Furthermore, South Dakota law at the time did not distinguish between writing a "no account"
check for a small amount and writing a "no account" check for a large sum. Id. at 296 n.20.
148 See Grossman, supra note 96, at 127 n.l33 ("Understandably, the Court was reluctant to
overturn a decision that it had rendered only three years earlier and had relied upon in a decision the
previous year.").
149 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
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broader issue of harsh sentencing. In both of these cases, the Court upheld
harsh sentences for first-time convictions involving illegal drugs. In Hutto,
which was decided before Solem, the defendant was convicted of
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and distribution of
marijuana. 151 The jury sentenced him to twenty years on each count2to be
served consecutively, and imposed a $10,000 fine for each count. 15 The
Supreme Court upheld the sentence, reversing the lower court's decision
without engaging in any consideration of the nature of the offense, the
culpability of the defendant, or the severity of the punishment. 153 Rather,
the Court emphasized that '''successful challenges to theproportionality of
particular sentences' should be 'exceedingly rare. ",15 The Court in
Rummel at least recognized the necessity of identifying a state interest in
punishing recidivists harshly. The Davis per curiam opinion did not
attempt to identify the state's interest in punishing Davis so severely for a
crime involving only about nine ounces of marijuana. 155 Instead, the
"summary disposition"156 of the case rested primarily on the intrusion by
the Court of Appeals157 "into the basic linedrawing ~rocess that is 'properly
within the province of the legislatures, not courts. '" 58 This sent a signal to
lower courts that the Supreme Court really did not recognize
proportionality review.
The plurality opinion in Harmelin, on the other hand, considered some
facts related to the defendant's culpability. This was not as fair as it seems,
however, because the plurality credited such facts that the prosecution had
not been required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. In the context of
discussing the defendant's argument regarding the mandatory nature of the
life sentence without parole, the plurality referred to the significance of
prosecutorial discretion: 159
Here the prosecutor may have chosen to seek the maximum penalty
because petitioner possessed 672.5 grams of undiluted cocaine and
several other trappings of a drug trafficker, including marijuana cigarettes,
four brass cocaine straws, a cocaine spoon, ... a Motorola beeper, ~Iastic
bags containing cocaine, a coded address book, and $3,500 in cash. I 0
Yet, the prosecutor did not charge Harmelin with the offense of
possession with the intent to distribute, which would have been supported
150 501 U.s. 957 (1991).
151 Hulto, 454 U.s. at 371.
152 {d. at 371.
153 {d. at 372-75.
154 {d. at 374 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 272).
155 {d. at 375 (Powell, J., concurring).
156 {d. at 381 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for deciding the case in the absence
of full briefing or oral argument).
157 The Court of Appeals found the 40-year sentence unconstitutional after applying a four-part
test formulated by another Court of Appeals in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973).
158 454 U.S. at 374 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 275-76).
159 Interestingly, one commentator has observed that in the context of the imposition of capital
punishment, the Supreme Court has not credited "prosecutorial discretion as a source of arbitrariness."
Latzer, Proportionality Review, supra note 10, at 1183.
160 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,1008 (1991).
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by the quoted facts and resulted in the same sentence. As the dissent
pointed out, "[b]ecause the statutory punishment for the two crimes is the
same, the State succeeded in punishing Harmelin as if he had been
convicted of the more serious crime without being put to the test of proving
his guilt on those charges."161 Thus, when considering the issue of the
defendant's individual culpability, the plurality relied on facts that the
prosecution was not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict
Harmelin of the "lesser" offense of possession. Furthermore, the plurality
did not fully consider the defendant's culpability because it gave no
consideration to the fact that the crime was his first offense. 162 This is
inconsistent with the analyses of general culpability in both Rummel and
Solem. If the presence of a criminal record is relevant to the
proportionality of a prison term, the absence of such a record should also
be relevant. As discussed earlier, the plurality placed a great deal of
emphasis on the threat illegal drugs pose to society on a broad and general
basis. Given this, it would seem that possession with intent to distribute
should be punished more severely than mere possession. This issue is
addressed in the Harmelin dissent. The dissent's comparison of the two
offenses of drug possession and drug possession with the intent to
distribute raises the fourth consideration involved in comparative analysis
of the sentence imposed.
4. Intra-Jurisdictional Comparisons ofPunishment
An intra-jurisdictional analysis of punishment focuses on the issue of
gradation of punishment. Certainly, this aspect of proportionality relates to
the first consideration regarding the nature of the offense as compared to
the sentence imposed, but it centers more on comparing the punishment for
the offense at issue to punishment for other crimes in the same jurisdiction.
This principle of gradation is a component of both retributive and utilitarian
theories of punishment. Jeremy Bentham stated, "for the sake of giving
[the punishment] the better chance of outweighing the profit of the offense,
[t]he greater the mischief of the offense, the greater is the exr:ense which it
may be worthwhile to be at, in the way of punishment.,,1 3 He further
pronounced that "[w]here two offenses come in competition, the
punishment for the greater offense must be sufficient to induce a man to
prefer the less.,,164 Therefore, the importance of grading offenses and
punishments stems from the idea that this can deter criminals from
engaging in more serious behavior, an idea that rests upon the presumption
that some offenses are more serious than others.
161 Id. at 1025 (White, J., dissenting).
162 Id. (pointing out that "the particular concerns reflected in recidivist statutes such as those in
Rummel and Solem are not at issue here").
163 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
86-88 (John Bowring ed., 1843) (1780).
164 Id.
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In the context of proportionality, this idea was highlighted as early as
1892 by Justice Field in 0 'Neil v. Vermont. 165 In this case, the defendant
was convicted of 457 bootlegging offenses and sentenced to 54 years of
imprisonment. In his decision, Justice Field pointed out that other, more
serious offenses carried less severe sentences: "Had [the defendant] been
found guilty of burglary or highway robbery, he would have received less
punishment than for the offenses of which he was convicted. It was six
times as great as any court in Vermont could have imposed for
manslaughter, forgery or perjury.,,166 The importance of gradation was
further underscored by the Court in Weems v. United States where it stated
that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to the offense.,,167 The Court further supported
this contention by pointing out that, in some jurisdictions, "[t]here are
degrees of homicide that are not punished so severely [as the offense of
falsifying a public document]."168
Similarly, in Solem, where the non-violent recidivist received a life
sentence, the Court noted that the same sentence was -required for murder
and permissible for "treason, first-degree manslaughter, first-degree arson
and kidnapping.,,169 The Court also pointed out that, even as to recidivism,
the state's punishment scheme made distinctions between second and third
convictions for certain offenses. For example, a life sentence was
mandatory for a second or third conviction for treason, first-degree
manslaughter, first-degree arson, or kidnapping. In addition, the scheme
permitted a life sentence for a second or third conviction for first-degree
rape, and allowed such a sentence after three convictions of any nature. All
of this supported the notion that the defendant in Solem was "treated in the
same manner as, or more severely than, criminals who have committed far
more serious crimes.,,17o This emphasis upon the grading of offenses
reflects the idea that different crimes result in different harms, and the
subsequent conclusion that more serious harms should be punished more
severely. In Coker v. Georgia, the Court determined that imposition of the
death penalty for the crime of rape was disproportionate and hence
unconstitutional, in large part because the harm caused by rape, although
serious, "does not compare with murder," for which the death penalty may
be imposed. 17I Following this logic, it would seem absurd that the crime
for which the defendant was convicted in Weems, falsifying a single public
document that did not result in any financial gain to the defendant, was
punished the same as an offense "which might cause the loss of many
165 144 U.s. 323 (1892).
1661d. at 339 (Field, J., dissenting). For a description of the majority ruling in O'Neil, see supra
note 71.
167 Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349,367 (1910).
168 Id. at 380.
169 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 298 (1983) (citations omitted).
170/d. at 299.
171 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977). See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(holding that the death penalty for a murder conviction, in the abstract, is not unconstitutionally cruel or
unusual).
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thousands of dollars.,,172 Again, the difference in the harms caused by
different offenses, and the importance of punishing according to such
differences, are underscored.
This is a clear demonstration of the Court's inconsistency in the weight
it accords the notion of grading offenses and their punishments. Some
opinions reflect general skepticism about the existence of a method for
evaluating terms of imprisonment for excessiveness. In Rummel v. Estelle,
for example, the Court noted that
[0]nce the death penalty and other punishments different in kind from fine
or imprisonment have been put to one side, there remains little in the way
of objective standards for judging whether or not a life sentence imposed
under a recidivist statute for several separate felony convictions not
involving 'violence' violates the cruel-and-unusual punishment
prohibition of the Eighth Amendment. 173
More specifically, some justices do not think it is appropriate for a
court to second guess a legislature's judgment that one crime Ehould be
punished the same or more severely than another. The Rummel Court
gives, by way of example, the following:
The highly placed executive who embezzles huge sums from a state
savings and loan association, causing many shareholders of limited means
to lose substantial parts of their savings, has committed a crime very
different from a man who takes a smaller amount of money from the same
savings and loan at the point of a gun. Yet rational people could disagree
as to which criminal merits harsher punishment. 174
Indeed, Bedau has pointedly asked, "Granted that murder is more
harmful than rape, how much worse is it in terms of harm to the victim (or
to society)? Twice as harmful?,,175 Similarly, the plurality in Harmelin v.
Michigan stated "that the fixing of prison terms for specific crimes involves
a substantive penological judgment that, as a ~eneral matter, is 'properly
within the province of legislatures, not courts.'" 76 In light of this, it seems
that justices opposed to intra-jurisdictional analysis of sentences are
primarily concerned with the judiciary overstepping its bounds and
encroaching on matters that are exclusively within the province of the
legislature.
There are at least two problems with this idea. First, the above quotes
are relevant to setting the exact sentence for an offense. A court does not
need to answer this question when evaluating proportionality. Intra-
112 Weems, 217 U.S. at 381.
173 445 U.S. 263, 282 n.27 (1980).
174 Id. See also Solem, 463 U.S. at 309 (Burger, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court "flatly
rejected Rummel's suggestion that we measure his sentence against the sentences imposed by Texas for
other crimes").
175 Hugo Adam Bedau, Concessions to Retribution in Punishment, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT
51, 64 (J.B. Cederblom & William L. Blizek eds., 1977). However, it is not clear that the Rummel
Court would necessarily agree with the assumption that murder is more serious than rape.
176 Harrnelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Rummel,
445 U.S. at 275-76).
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jurisdictional analysis should consider how, for example, the sentence for
shoplifting compares to that of rape: if the sentence for shoplifting is equal
to or substantially greater than the punishment for rape, the sentence for
shoplifting may well be disproportionate. It is difficult to see how such a
comparison of harms can be so subjective as to justify no analysis of
proportionality. While such an inquiry involves a certain degree of
subjectivity, when considered with the other factors discussed in this
article, a reviewing court must always exercise some degree of subjective
judgment when deciding whether the legislature has overstepped its
authority.
The second problem with limiting judicial power to analyze sentencing
is that the argument regarding the proper role of the court is really a
response to the threshold question of whether the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause requires any proportionality review
at all, yet it has been used to limit any proportionality principle. This is not
justifiable. While such concerns may be reflected legitimately in a test for
assessing proportionality, by a somewhat deferential standard of review, the
Court in Rummel and Davis provided little or no guidance for such an
assessment. In those cases, the Court indicated that even though it
acknowledged proportionality in principle, no federal court should find a
sentence of imprisonment unconstitutionally excessive. 177 Such an
approach does not explain why, as indicated by the Court in Rummel, a
proportionality principle would apply in the situation of a life sentence for
overtime parking but not a life sentence for other offenses. 178 Furthermore,
it does not explain why a court is justified in evaluating the proportionality
of the death penalty as punishment for certain offenses, but not in
evaluating the proportionality of terms of imprisonment. As Justice Powell
noted in Rummel, "[t]he Court concedes today that the principle of
disproportionality plays a role in the review of sentences imposing the
death penalty, but suggests that the principle may be less applicable when a
non-capital sentence is challenged. Such a limitation finds no support in
the history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.,,179 Likewise, proponents
of the exceedingly narrow view of proportionality exemplified by Rummel
and Davis also purport to eschew an inter-jurisdictional comparison of the
sentence imposed.
5. Inter-Jurisdictional Comparisons ofPunishment
A comparative analysis of how states punish certain crimes has been
consistently employed in the context of the death penalty. In Gregg v.
177 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272 ("Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to
the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare."); Hullo v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370,
374 (1982) (per curiam) (stating that "federal courts should be '[reluctant] to review legislatively
mandated terms of imprisonment' and that 'successful challenges to the proportionality of particular
sentences' should be 'exceedingly rare'" (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274, 272)).
178 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.ll.
179/d. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Georgia,180 the Court pointed to language in Trop v. Dulles stating that the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
must be drawn "'from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society. ",181 The Court in Gregg interpreted this
language to mean that it requires an "assessment of contemporary values
concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction.,,182 It further required
the Court to "look to objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward
a given sanction.,,183 In considering society's view of the death penalty, the
Court found that "[t]he most marked indication of society's endorsement of
the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman. The
legislatures of at least 35 states have enacted new statutes that provide for
the deathJenalty for at least some crimes that result in the death of another
person.,,1 With this decision, the Court implicitly indicated that Eighth
Amendment analysis requires consideration of society's view of certain
sanctions for certain crimes, and such a societal view is best reflected in
legislation enacted by the representatives of the people. Indeed, in Coker v.
Georgia, the Court began its analysis by considering "the objective
evidence of the country's present judgment concerning the acceptability of
death as a penalty for rape of an adult woman.,,185 Most recently, in Atkins
v. Virginia,186 the Court examined how state legislatures responded to the
Court's earlier decision of Penry v. Lynaugh, which found that execution of
mentally retarded criminals was not cruel and unusual punishment. 18?
When the Court initially considered this issue, only two states prohibited
the execution of mentally retarded criminals. Since Penry, sixteen more
states enacted legislation prohibiting such executions. 188 The Court stated
that these changes since Penry "provide[] powerful evidence that today our
society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable
than the average criminal. ,,189
The Court's approach to inter-jurisdictional comparisons also has been
inconsistent in the context of terms of imprisonment. The Weems Court
recognized the significance of sentencing in other jurisdictions, noting that
an offense similar to that for which Weems was convicted under the federal
penal code carried a maximum sentence of two years, as compared to the
IRO 428 U.S. 153 (1976).




IRS 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977). After examining legislation in jurisdictions imposing the death
penalty, the Court concluded, "[t]he upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States at
the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman, and only
two other jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the victim is a child. The current judgment
with respect to the death penalty for rape ... weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital
punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman." ld. at 595-96 (citations omitted).
IR6 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
187 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
18R See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15.
IR91d. at 2249.
244 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:217
fifteen years plus accessories imposed on him. 190 Likewise, in Trap v.
Dulles, where federal law imposed a penalty of denationalization, the Court
looked to the use of such punishment in other countries to conclude that
"[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.,,191
In assessing the life sentence without parole for the recidivist in Solem,
the Court also concluded that "[a]t the very least ... it is clear that [the
defendant] could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 50
states.,,192 However, unlike the Courts in the death penalty cases cited
above, the Court in Solem failed to state expressly that the purpose of
employing an inter-jurisdictional analysis of imprisonment terms for the
same offense is to identify contemporary values. It did, however, cite to
Enmund, which involved the death penalty in the context of the felony
murder rule, and Coker, which considered the death penalty for rape, as
examples of precedents in which the Court engaged in such comparative
analysis. 193 Thus, it is arguable that some Justices view such a
consideration of contemporary values as legitimate outside the context of
the death penalty. This contention is further supported by the fact that the
langt!al!e regarding "evolving standards of decency" is from a non-capital
case. 19<t"
However, in other cases, the Court has indicated that such a
comparative analysis is not determinative or even very helpful. In Rummel,
the recidivist defendant presented evidence to show that he "might have
received more lenient treatment in almost any State other than Texas, West
Virginia, or Washington.,,195 To illustrate the inherent complexity of a
comparative analysis, the Court noted that different jurisdictions define
recidivism differently-some upon a third felony conviction, like Texas,
and others upon a fourth felony conviction. 196 Moreover, some
jurisdictions require that the felony be serious or violent, while in others
any felony triggers the habitual criminal statute. 197 In addition to
recognizing varying state treatment of recidivists, the Court also noted
other "variable[s] complicating the calculus.,,198 Specifically, the Court
addressed the possibility of parole under Texas law in "as little as 12
years.,,199 Finally, the Court found it significant that "[i]t is a matter of
common knowledge that prosecutors often exercise their discretion in
190 See Weems, 217 U.S. at 804.
I'll 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958).
192 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 299 (1983).
19) Solem, 463 U.S. at 292 ("In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review of capital
punishment statutes and determined that 'only about a third of American jurisdictions would ever
permit a defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die.' ... The analysis in Coker was essentially
the same.") (citations omitted).
194 Trap, 356 U.S. at 101.
195 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 279 (1980).
196 See id. at 279 n.19.
197 See id. at 280.
19' See id. at 281.
199 See id. at 280.
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invoking recidivist statutes or in plea bargaining so as to screen out truly
'petty' offenders who fall within the literal terms of such statutes."zoo The
Court points to all of these considerations to illustrate "the complexities
confronting any court that would attempt such a comparison."ZOI
In addition to emphasizing the difficulties involved in inter-
jurisdictional comparisons, the Rummel Court implies that such
comparisons may not even be helpful. The Court claims, for example, that
even if Rummel's sentence "was the most stringent found in the 50 states,
that severity hardly would render [his] punishment 'grossly
disproportionate' to his offenses."zoz Thus, according to the Rummel
decision, the harshest punishment in the United States for a recidivist does
not necessarily violate the Eighth Amendment. The decision does not
make clear exactly what term of imprisonment the Court might find grossly
disproportionate, other than a life sentence for a parking at an expired
meter. Even in this situation, it is not clear how the Rummel Court would
analyze such a term of imprisonment. Likewise, the Harmelin plurality
opinion contributes little to jurisprudential clarity in this area.
C. THE HARMELIN ApPROACH
In Harmelin, the plurality accepted the principle of proportionality in
cases of non-capital sentences but rejected the need to engage in any intra-
or inter-jurisdictional comparative analysis in all but very limited
situations, again emphasizing the importance of deferring to the legislature
in such matters. The plurality in Harmelin set out a test for proportionality
which considers, as a threshold matter, whether the defendant's sentence is
"grossly disproportionate" to the gravity of the crime?03 According to
Justice Kennedy, a comparative analysis is "appropriate only in the rare
case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality."zo4
Justice Kennedy further stated that "[t]he proper role for comparative
analysis of sentences, then, is to validate an initial judgment that a sentence
is grossly disproportionate to a crime."zos
The problem with this approach is that it is not clear how a reviewing
court should decide whether, as a threshold matter, the sentence imposed is
grossly disproportionate to the offense. In Harmelin, Justice Kennedy
examined the drug problem and determined that an offense involving
illegal drugs is "far more grave than the crime at issue in Solem."zo6 Thus it
is possible that if the offense is more serious than writing a "no account"
check, any term of imprisonment is constitutional. This, however, is not
200 Id. at 281. See supra note 159 regarding such discretion in the context of arbitrary application
of the death penalty.
201 Id.
202 Id.
20) Hannelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,1001 (1991) (Kennedy, 1., concurring).
204 Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20S Id.
206 Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, 1., concurring).
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analytically sound. A test that evaluates whether the criminal offense is
more or less serious than the offense in Solem only serves to distinguish
Solem as something of an anomaly, which can only be reconciled with
other cases by so distinguishing it. The Hamelin plurality test contributes
little to proportionality jurisprudence. In prior cases, the Court has
emphasized the need for "objective criteria" when evaluating a
punishment's proportionality. Justice Kennedy's approach of engaging in a
comparative analysis only after an initial determination of gross
disproportionality is hardly objective. In fact, it seems to allow for a sort of
judicial gut reaction to a sentence before deciding whether to compare the
sentence to other crimes or to sentences in other jurisdictions. At least one
commentator has concluded that Harmelin s "gross disproportionality
standard is, in practice, tantamount to a complete abdication of judicial
review of sentence proportionality.,,207 .Finally, the Harmelin plurality
approach to reviewing prison sentences for excessiveness is inconsistent
with developments in other areas where the Court evaluates
proportionality-the areas of forfeitures and punitive damages awards.
II. IS MONEY DIFFERENT?
A. FORFEITURES
Before 1989, the Supreme Court had not focused on the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.208 In Browning-Ferris Industries
v. Kelc% 9 the Court held that this clause did not apply to punitive
damages awards in a civil suit, and further suggested that the scope of the
Excessive Fines Clause was limited to criminal cases.2lO In 1993, only two
years after the Harmelin plurality all but eliminated proportionality review
of prison sentences, the Court decided two cases that signaled an expansion
of the Court's application of the Excessive Fines Clause. In Alexander v.
United States,21 the Court was unanimous in its decision to remand the
case to the Court of Agpeals for an evaluation of the excessiveness of the
criminal in personam2 2 forfeiture of the defendant's wholesale and retail
207 Johnson, supra note 26, at 503. See also Gershowitz, supra note 26, at 1277 ("Despite a
plethora of cases meting out lengthy punishments for arguably minor crimes, only two courts have
struck down punishments as disproportionate in the nine years since Harmelin."); Grossman, supra note
96, at 161 n.352 (discussing confusion among lower federal courts after Harmelin, with some courts
concluding Harmelin overruled Solem and that there is "no proportionality requirement after Harmelin,
notwithstanding the stance seven Justices took in support of some kind ofproportionality principle").
208 The Eighth Amendment states, in its entirety: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
209 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
210 See Johnson, supra note 26, at 469. Nonetheless, the Court stated that it was unnecessary to
decide whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies only to criminal cases. Kelco, 492 U.S. at 263.
211 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
212 This is considered a criminal forfeiture and thus makes up part of a criminal defendant's
sentence. It "requires no independent action on the part of the government." Johnson, supra note 26, at
465.
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businesses and nearly $9 million.213 The Court concluded that "[t]he in
personam criminal forfeiture at issue here is clearly a form of monetary
punishment no different, for Eighth Amendment purposes, from a
traditional 'fine. ",214 During the same term, in Austin v. United States/IS
the Court unanimouslyl6 held that civil in rem forfeitures under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 are also subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny for excessiveness.217
In Austin the Court acknowledged that its prior cases had emphasized a
civil-criminal dichotomy in cases of civil forfeitures,218 but found that for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment, the critical inquiry eschews such a
distinction. The Court concluded instead that the focus should be on
whether the government is extracting a punishment, noting that the notion
of punishments "cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal
21) While four Justices dissented in Alexander, their dissenting opinion focused on the First
Amendment issue raised by the case and urged that it was not necessary to reach the Eighth
Amendment issue. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., dissent). Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy
stated, "[g]iven the Court's principal holding, I can interpose no objection to remanding the case for
further consideration under the Eighth Amendment." ld. Justice Souter wrote a short concurring
opinion in which he agreed "with the Court that the case should be remanded for a determination
whether the forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clause." ld. at 560 (Souter, J., concurring).
2141d. at 558.
215 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
216 Justice Scalia wrote separately to question the majority's account of history and precedent and
to set out a method for evaluating the excessiveness of in rem forfeitures. ld. at 627 (Scalia, 1.,
concurring) ("Unlike monetary fines, statutory in rem forfeitures have traditionally been fixed, not by
determining the appropriate value of the penalty in relation to the committed offense, but by
determining what property has been 'tainted' by unlawful use ... ."). Justice Kennedy also wrote
separately to express similar concerns regarding Part III of the opinion's use of history and precedent,
but was silent as to how best to evaluate excessiveness. ld. at 628-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See
also David Lieber, Note, Eighth Amendment-The Excessive Fines Clause Austin v. United States, 84 J.
CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 805, 820 (1994) (suggesting that it was unnecessary for the majority to "delve
into the history of forfeiture").
217 This is considered a civil action "brought by the government against the property itself."
Johnson, supra note 26, at 466. Thus, it is not dependent upon a criminal conviction.
218 Austin, 509 U.S. at 608 nA ("As general matter, this Court's decisions applying constitutional
protections to civil forfeiture proceedings have adhered to this distinction between [constitutional]
provisions that are limited to criminal proceedings and provisions that are not.") (citations omitted).
For an earlier example of the blurring of the civil-criminal dichotomy, see Halper v. United States, 490
U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment was violated by a
proceeding following a criminal conviction in which the government sought additional monies from the
defendant and determining that the second judgment was an additional punishment). See also Susan R.
Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679 (1999) (discussing the
Supreme Court's inconsistent approach to defining a distinction between the criminal and the civil,
noting in particular the different approaches used in the context of Double Jeopardy and the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment); Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts" as Corporate
Just Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 289 (1998) (discussing the overlap of tort law and criminal law
and proposing a different doctrinal approach to this hybrid); Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on
Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the
Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 1325, 1326 nA (1991) (noting that "the distinction
between criminal and civil law seems to be collapsing across a broad front" and proposing that
legislative labeling be the exclusive method for determining the appropriate category). But see Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958) (analyzing whether denationalization constitutes punishment for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment, and stating, "[h]ow simple would be the tasks of law generally if
specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels pasted on them!").
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law.,,219 In this instance, the Court shunned one dichotomy only to embrace
another. After Austin, the appropriate question to ask when deciding
whether the Eighth Amendment covers forfeitures is whether the forfeiture
is at least partially punitive in nature or serves solely remedial purposes.220
Once the Court determined that the forfeiture involved in Austin
furthered punitive purposes and was thus subject to Eighth Amendment
scrutiny, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for an
evaluation of excessiveness. The majority did not, however, provide anx
guidance to the lower court as to how to engage in such an evaluation.2 I
Similarly, in Alexander, the Court provided little guidance as to the
appropriate measure of excessiveness, other than the above statement that
the forfeiture in Alexander is the same as a fine. 222 The Court hinted at the
significance of the defendant's culpability as relevant to excessiveness
while addressing the defendant's argument about the nature of his offense.
The defendant argued that since the jury had found that only four
magazines and three videotapes were obscene, the confiscation and
destruction of all of his business assets was excessive. The Court pointed
out that the defendant "was convicted of creating and managing ... 'an
enormous racketeering enterprise.' . . . It is in light of the extensive
criminal activities which [the defendant] . . . conducted . . . over a
substantial period of time that the question whether the forfeiture was
'excessive' must be considered.,,223 Although the Court left this question to
the Court of Appeals, it strongly suggested that the forfeiture in Alexander
was not unconstitutional, given the defendant's broad and general
culpability.224
As to the standard for assessing the constitutionality of in rem
forfeitures, Justice Scalia, concurring in Austin, attempted to provide some
guidance, noting that "the excessiveness inquiry for statutogr in rem
forfeitures is different from the usual excessiveness inquiry.',zz Justice
Scalia did concede that with respect to monetary fines and in personam
forfeitures "the touchstone is [the] value of the fine [or property forfeited]
in relation to the offense.',226 According to Justice Scalia, the relationship
between the value of the assets forfeited and the offense committed by the
defendant is not relevant to the constitutionality of in rem forfeitures. As to
civil in rem forfeitures, it is necessary to determine "what property has
219 Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (citing United States v. Harper, 490 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1989».
220 ld. ("In considering this question, we are mindful of the fact that sanctions frequently serve
more than one purpose. We need not exclude the possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial purposes
.... We, however, must determine that it can only be explained as serving in part to punish.")
221 ld. at 622-23 ("Prudence dictates that we allow the lower courts to consider that
[excessiveness) question in the first instance.")
222 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
22J ld. at 559.
224 See Johnson, supra note 26, at 474--78 (noting that after Austin and Alexander lower federal
courts concluded that a property owner would have to demonstrate a high threshold of
dispro~ortionality)(citations omitted).
2 5 Austin, 509 U.S. at 623 (Scalia, J., concurring).
226Id. at 627.
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been 'tainted' by unlawful use .... [Thus, t]he question is not how much
the confiscated property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has
a close enough relationship to the offense.,,227 This has been coined the
"instrumentality test.,,228 It is not clear what justifies a different test for in
rem forfeitures. One commentator has suggested that Justice Scalia's
"principal argument seems to be that excessiveness in the forfeiture context
is limited to the instrumentality determination because it has always been
that way.,,229 It may be that Justice Scalia's distinction is based on the
historic treatment of in rem proceedings as involving "guilty property"
rather than a guilty person.230
The problem with this "crabbed" approach231 is that it undermines the
Austin majority's focus on the question of punishment rather than the civil-
criminal dichotomy.232 It does not make sense to first conclude that
forfeiture serves punitive and deterrent purposes and thus comes within the
reach of the Excessive Fines Clause, and then apply a test for
proportionality that does not take those goals of punishment into account.
The facts of Austin illustrate this point. Austin pled guilty to one count of
possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Austin agreed to sell some
cocaine while he was at his body shop. He then went to his nearby mobile
home and returned to the shop with two grams of cocaine. The government
sought forfeiture of the body shop and the mobile home.233 According to
the majority in Austin, such a forfeiture constitutes punishment subject to
Eighth Amendment proportionality scrutiny. To ask, as Justice Scalia
asserts, only whether there is a sufficient connection between the property
and the offense is to divert proportionality analysis into an evaluation of
"tainted" or "guilty" property, and to i~ore a comparison of the offense
committed and the punishment imposed. 34
227 Id. at 627-28.
2281d. ("an in rem forfeiture goes beyond the traditional limits that the Eighth Amendment pennits
if it applies to property that cannot properly be regarded as an instrumentality of the offense"). This test
is also referred to as the "close enough relationship test." Poe, supra note 110, at 253-56.
229 Johnson, supra note 26, at 475.
230 See id. at 466 n.33 ("This 'guilty property' fiction has been criticized extensively by modem
commentators" (citing Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy. Quick. and Profitable also be Fair?
Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCIi. L. REV. 1, 19 (1994) (calling
this fiction "irrational and superstitious"»).
23' Johnson, supra note 26, at 464 n.21
2J2 Poe, supra note 110, at 256 ("this [guilty property] fiction is based on the traditional distinction
between in rem and in personam forfeiture, a distinction at odds with the Austin majority's reasoning").
233 The opinion notes that a search warrant was executed on the home and shop and resulted in the
discovery of "small amounts of marijuana and cocaine, a .22 caliber revolver, drug paraphernalia, and
approximately $4,700 in cash." Austin, 509 U.S. at 605. The opinion does not reveal whether these
items were found in the home, in the shop, or both. But see Poe, supra note 110, at 240 (1994) (setting
out the facts from the lower court opinion, United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1992),
stating that the fruits of the search were discovered in both the mobile home and the body shop).
234 See Lieber, supra note 216, at 825 (suggesting that Justice Scalia's test for excessiveness,
which relies heavily on the civil-criminal distinction eroded by the majority opinion, was Justice
Scalia's way of reconciling Austin with his opinion in Harmelin, which rejected any proportionality
principle).
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In the more recent case of United States v. Bajakajian, the Court
clarified some aSQects of the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, while
muddying others.235 The defendant in Bajakajian violated a federal law by
attempting to leave the count~ without reporting that he was carrying more
than $10,000 in currency.23 The total amount of currency that the
defendant failed to disclose was $357,144.237 The Supreme Court
determined that forfeiture of this amount was unconstitutionally
excessive.238 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, applied Austin and
concluded that the forfeiture of the unreported currency constituted
punishment.239 The Court reached this conclusion based on the fact that the
forfeiture was "imposed at the culmination of an underlying felony.,,24o
The Court also noted that the government argued that the forfeiture served
the purpose of "deter[ing] illicit movements of cash.,,241 Rather than
support the government's argument that the forfeiture was remedial, and
not punitive, the Court stated that "[d]eterrence ... has traditionally been
viewed as a goal ofpunishment.,,242 Thus, consistent with Austin, the Court
held that as long as the forfeiture is partly punitive, it is subject to the
Excessive Fines Clause.243 The Court relied on the punitive nature of this
forfeiture to distinguish this case from the traditional acceptance of
forfeiture of property for customs violations and other in rem forfeitures. 244
This led the dissent to accuse the majority of essentially overruling Austin
and reviving the civil-criminal dichotomy.245 In fact, one commentator has
pointed out that several federal courts have relied on the dissenting opinion
in Bajakajian to conclude that the Excessive Fines Clause does not cover in
rem forfeitures. 246 The same commentator argued that such an
interpretation of the majority's opinion is not necessary.247 Nonetheless,
the Court does seem to have clouded the issue of the scope of the Excessive
Fines Clause. However, the Court provided greater guidance as to how to
assess excessiveness.
Most significantly, the Court eschewed the "instrumentality test.,,248
The Court stated that "[t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under




239 See id. at 328.
240 See id.
241 See id. at 329.
242 See id.
243 See id. at 329 n.4.
244 See id. at 331.
245 See id. at 355 (Kennedy, 1., dissenting) ("The majority subjects this forfeiture to scrutiny
because it is in personam, but it then suggests most in rem forfeitures ... may not be fines at all. The
suggestion, one might note, is inconsistent or at least in tension with Allstin.") (citations omitted).
246 See Johnson, sllpra note 26, at 488.
247 See id. at 489 ("Justice Kennedy's critique is valid only if the Framers' view that in rem civil
forfeitures are not fines is binding on the Court in its contemporary interpretation of that provision. The
Court, however, is not so bound.")
248 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 333-334 ("It is therefore irrelevant whether respondent's currency is an
instrumentality; the forfeiture is punitive, and the test for the excessiveness of a punitive forfeiture
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the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount
of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense
that it is designed to punish.,,249 This echoes the notion that the punishment
must fit the crime, discussed in Section n.B of this Article. The standard of
"gross disproportionality" adopted by the Bajakajian majority is similar to
the standard used by Justice Kennedj; in his Harmelin plurality opinion, Xet
the Court does not cite to Harmelin. 50 Instead, the Court cites to Solem.25 \
The specific cite to Solem is in the context of recognizing the legislature's
role in deciding appropriate punishments, thus justifying a more deferential
"gross disproportionality" standard, rather than one of "strict
proportionality.,,252 Nonetheless, the conspicuous absence of Harmelin is
significant.
The analysis of proportionality in Bajakajian mirrors the factors set out
earlier in this article as important considerations in the context of
evaluating the proportionality of criminal punishments. As to the nature of
the offense in the abstract, the Court pointed out that the defendant's "crime
was solely a reporting offense. It was permissible to transport the currency
out of the country so long as he reported it.,,253 Further, the Court stated
that
[t]he harm that [Bajakajian] caused was also minimal. Failure to report
his currency affected only one party, the Government, and in a relatively
minor way. There was no fraud on the United States, and [he] caused no
loss to the public fisc. Had his crime gone undetected, the Government
would have been deprived only of the information that $357,144 had left
the country.254
This is similar to the analysis used by the Weems Court, which
emphasized the fact that the defendant's offense of falsifying a public
document did not result in any financial gain to the defendant, yet was
punished the same as an offense "which might cause the loss of many
thousands of dollars.,,255 The Bajakajian Court also engaged in
comparative analysis when it noted that the maximum fine for the non-
involves solely a proportionality detennination") (emphasis added). See also Johnson, supra note 26, at
491-92 (noting, first, that the majority opinion did not reject Austin's inclusion of in rem forfeitures
within the coverage of the Excessive Fines Clause, and stating that "[t]his interpretation of Bajakajian
suggests that the Supreme Court's adoption of the gross disproportionality standard in that case
necessarily represents a repudiation of Justice Scalia's instrumentality test"). But see Barclay Thomas
Johnson, Note, Restoring Civility-The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of2000: Baby Steps Towards
a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 IND. L. REv. 1045, 1064 (2002) (concluding that the
Bajakaiian test did not abolish all consideration of instrumentality).
249 Id. at 334.
250 See generally id. See also Hannelin v. Michigan, 50 I U.S. 957, 994 (1991).
251 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336.
252 See id.
253 Id. at 337 (emphasis added).
254 Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
255 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,381 (1910). See supra notes 24, 27 and accompanying
text.
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reporting offense under the Sentencing Guidelines was $5,000.256
Primarily, however, the Court focused on the issue of the defendant's
culpability. The Court emphasized the facts in this specific case-the
failure to report was not related to any other illegal activities and that
Bajakajian "[wa]s not a money launderer, a drug trafficker, or a tax
evader.,,257 Indeed, the district court determined that the currency "was the
proceeds of legal activity and was to be used to repay a lawful debt.,,258
The Court also noted that although the defendant was indicted for lying/59
this was not part of the non-reporting offense.260 This is similar to the
consideration in Solem of the fact that none of the defendant's convictions
involved violence, and that the amount of money at issue in each crime was
smal1. 261 Thus, in Bajakajian the Court was mostly concerned with
retributive notions of punishment because it focused on the severity of
punishment that this individual defendant deserved. One commentator has
referred to this approach to proportionality as "desert-oriented.,,262 While
the dissent agrees with the standard of "gross disproportionality" it reaches
a different conclusion in applying that standard.
Justice Kennedy's analysis of excessiveness in his dissent in
Bajakajian is similar to that of his plurality opinion in Harmelin. First,
Justice Kennedy argues that the offense was serious and that it was
inappropriate for the Court to question the judgment of Congress in harshly
punishing this offense, which is so often linked to drug trafficking and
money laundering. This is similar to the federalism concerns Justice
Kennedy expressed in Harmelin about the seriousness of drug possession
and legislative judgment regarding the severity of the punishment.
Secondly, like the majority, Justice Kennedy also considered the individual
culpability of the defendant. However, Kennedy relied on facts that did not
form the basis for the defendant's conviction. These were similar to the
facts that he relied on in Harmelin to suggest that the defendant was in
possession of drugs with the intent to distribute even though he was only
convicted of illegal possession. In Bajakajian, Justice Kennedy argued that
the defendant was "guilt~ of repeated lies to Government agents and
suborning lies by others.,,2 3 Yet, once the defendant pled guilty to the non-
reporting offense, the Government dropped the false statement charge,z64
216 Bajakajian, 524 U.s. at 338. However, the dissent pointed out that the Sentencing Guidelines
also state "Forfeiture is to be imposed upon a convicted defendant as provided by statute." Thus, while
the Guidelines set out a fine of$5,OOO, they also contemplate that the defendant will forfeit property in
addition to suffering a criminal sentence and fine. Id. at 351 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). But see Poe, supra note liD, at 260-61 (suggesting that the Sentencing Guidelines be used as
an objective factor for evaluating the proportionality of a forfeiture as compared to the '''value' of the
property owner's culpable conduct").
217 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 338.
218 Id.
219 18 U.S.C. § 1001
260 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339 n.12.
261 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
262 Johnson, supra note 26, at 495.
263 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 352 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
264 Id. at 325.
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Thus, he was not convicted of making false statements.265 Justice Kennedy
also stated that Bajakajian's actions involved "most suspicious
circumstances. His luggage was stuffed with more than a third of a million
dollars. All of it was in cash, and much of it was hidden in a case with a
false bottom.,,266 Nonetheless, the government was not able to prove that
the currency was part of any illegal activity. Justice Kennedy's evaluation
of culpability in both Bajakajian and Harmelin is problematic because the
Court should not rely on facts not proven by the government or to speculate
about certain facts, which are not part of the offense for which the
defendant was convicted, in assessing the culpability of the defendant.
Indeed, such a consideration seems to be inconsistent with the holdings in
Ring and Apprendi requiring that factual determinations to support the
death penalty or an enhanced penalty be made by a jury?67 Furthermore,
other than disagreeing with the majority that the forfeiture was grossly
disproportional, Justice Kennedy's dissent in Bajakajian provides no
additional guidance as to what would constitute gross disproportionality.
It is interesting that Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion in
Bajakajian because, along with Justice Scalia, he has concluded that the
Eighth Amendment does not require proportionality review of prison
sentences, begging the question, "Is money different?"
B. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
This same question arises in the context of punitive damages awards.
The Supreme Court initially grappled with the question of whether the
Constitution places any limits on punitive damages awards. The Court
rejected the argument that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment requires an evaluation of excessiveness as to punitive damages
awards in Browning-Ferris v. Kelco.268 The Court concluded that the
Eighth Amendment is concerned "with direct actions initiated by
government to inflict punishment" and does not apply to "punitive damages
in cases between private parties.,,269 Two years later in Pacific Mutual Life
Ins. v. Haslip,270 decided the same year as Harmelin, the Court determined
265 The dissent points to statements by the district court that the defendant proffered a "suspicious
and confused story, documented in the poorest way, and replete with past misrepresentation."
Bajakajian, id. at 352 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). It is not clear, whether, for purposes of sentencing,
such factual findings would have to be made by a jury under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.s. 466
(2000).
266 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 353 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
267 See supra notes 40 and 41.
268 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
269 Id. at 259. But see Calvin M. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages:
Some Lessons/rom History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1987) (arguing that the "textual antecedents of the
Eighth Amendment, the political theory that underlies the adoption of the Eighth Amendment, and the
contemporary purposes served by punitive damages" support the conclusion that the Excessive Fines
Clause "should apply to the imposition of punitive damages and all judicially imposed monetary
sanctions in civil cases").
270 499 U.S. I, 1 (1991) (holding that the standards used at the trial and appellate level for
reviewing punitive damages awards had sufficiently protected the defendant from unlimited jury
discretion).
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that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
juries receive sufficient guidance regarding punitive damages awards and
also requires that amounts of such awards not cross the line into
unconstitutionality.271 In Haslip, the plaintiff brought a fraud action after
an agent of Pacific Mutual had embezzled insurance premiums rather than
remitting them to Pacific MutuaL272 When Pacific Mutual did not receive
Ms. Haslip's premium qalments, it cancelled her insurance, and her credit
was adversely affected. 7 The trial court found that the punitive damages
award of $840,000 was appropriate because the conduct involved
"evidenced intentional malicious, gross, or oppressive fraud," and that it
was necessary to deter similar conduct by insurers.274 The Supreme Court
noted that the punitive damages award was four times the compensatory
damages and thus "close to the line," but held that such an award did not
"cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety.,>275 Thus, in
Haslip, the Court acknowledged the existence of a constitutional line over
which punitive damages awards may not cross. As commentators have
concluded, "The Court's proportionality requirement is, in effect, a capping
of punitive damages. The Court has, in essence, entered the ideological
arena of tort reform where it had no previous role.,,276
In 1993, the Court addressed another fraud claim in TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,m and expressly stated what it had
implied in Haslip: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits a State from imposing "grossly excessive" punishment on a
tortfeasor.278 In this case, TXO had brought a frivolous declaratory
judgment action as to the title of certain property in an attempt to defraud
Alliance Resources.279 The Court upheld the punitive damages award of
ten million dollars/80 which was over 526 times the actual damages
awarded. In addition to considering the ratio of the punitive damages
award to the actual damages, the Court determined that "the amount of
money potentially at stake, the bad faith of [TXO], the fact that the scheme
employed in this case was part of a larger pattern of fraud, trickery and
deceit, and [TXO]'s wealth" supported a conclusion that the punitive
damages award was not "grossly excessive.,,281 One year later, in Honda
271/d. See also Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 V.S. 415 (1994) (emphasizing the importance of
procedure, the Court held that Oregon's system for awarding punitive damages violated due process
because it did not include a remittitur process by which a court could review such awards after the
verdict).
272 499 V.S. at 5.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 23.
2751d. at 23-24.
276 Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice
System as a Bal/leground ofSocial Theory, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1,65 (2002).
277 509 V.S. 443 (1993).
27R Id. at 453-54.
279 See id. at 449.
2RO See id. at 453, 466.
2RI Id. at 462.
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Motor Co. v. Oberg, the court required states to create post-verdict review
procedures of punitive damages for possible excessiveness.282
More recently, and for the first time, the Supreme Court struck a
punitive damages award as "grossly excessive." In BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, BMW failed to disclose to Dr. Gore that it had
repainted the car he purchased.283 The parties presumed that the car had
been damaged while beinEtransported between the manufacturing plantand the preparation center. 4 Gore sued BMW for fraud based on BMW's
suppression of a material fact.285 The jury awarded Gore $4,000 in
compensatory damages, apparently based on evidence that the repainted car
was worth ten percent less than the value of a new car that had not been
damaged or repainted.286 Gore argued that BMW had failed to disclose
such information in about a thousand other instances and argued that the
jury should multiply this number by the $4,000 reduction in value to arrive
at a punitive damages award of four million dollars.287 The jury so
d d G .. d 288awar e ore pumtIve amages.
The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the jury improperly included
similar sales in other states in its calculation of punitive damages, and
ordered a remittitur to two million dollars.289 Nonetheless, the United
States Supreme Court determined that even this reduced award was grossly
excessive?90 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that due process
requires that a person receive fair notice of the severity of any penalty a
state might impose.291 To evaluate the constitutionality of a particular
punitive damages award, the Court considered "three guideposts": "the
reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; the disparity between the harm or
potential harm suffered by Dr. Gore and his punitive damages award; and
the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases.,,292 First, the Court determined that as
compared to the behavior of the defendants in TXO Production Corp. and
Haslip, BMW's failure to disclose was less reprehensible than the
"deliberate false statements [and] acts of affirmative misconduct" present
in TXO Production Corp. and Haslip, especially where BMW believed in
good faith that there was no duty to disclose such information.293 In
addition, the Court pointed out that the harm Gore suffered was "purely
economic," having no effect on the safety of the car.294 As to the ratio, or
282 512 U.S. 415,434-35 (1994).
283 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
284 Id. at 563 n.l.
285 See id. at 563 n.3.
2861d. at 564-65.
2871d. at 564.





293 Id. at 579-80.
294 Id. at 576.
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proportionality, of the punitive damages award to the actual harm suffered
by Gore, the Court held that 500 to I was "dramatically greater than [the
ratios] considered in Haslit and TXQ," especially in the absence of any
threat of additional harm. 29
The third guidepost engages the Court in a comparative analysis,
examining possible statutory sanctions for the same conduct both in the
jurisdiction in question as well as in other jurisdictions. In Gore, the Court
pointed out that the maximum fine authorized under Alabama law for a
violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act was $2,000. Civil penalties
in other jurisdictions ranged from $50 for a first offense to $250 for
subsequent violations. The most severe penalties ranged from $5,000 to
$10,000. Thus, the two million dollars punitive damages award was
"substantiall~ greater than the statutory fines available in Alabama and
elsewhere.,,2 6 The Court acknowledged the state's interest in "punishing
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition," but concluded that BMW's
conduct was not sufficiently egregious to justify such a large punitive
damages award.297
Subsequently, in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,298
the Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard for reviewing
punitive dama~es awards was the more stringent, and less deferential, de
novo standard. 99 In cases before Cooper Industries and Gore, the Court
employed rhetoric indicating a willingness to strike down grossly excessive
punitive damages awards, but had not done so until Gore. Commentators
therefore concluded that with these two decisions, first finding a punitive
damages award excessive and second applying a more scrutinizing standard
of review on appeal, the Court sent a "signal to lower courts to be more
aggressive in reducing punitive damage awards.,,30o However, it is difficult
to determine the extent to which federal courts have heeded this signal.301
Nonetheless, it is certainly significant that the Court found the punitive
damages award in Gore to be excessive, thus giving teeth to this application
of the Due Process Clause.
Several salient themes emerge from the Court's jurisprudence on
punitive damages awards, especially compared to the jurisprudence on
proportionality of criminal punishments. First, as in the context of
forfeitures and criminal punishments, the Court confirmed that "[s]tates
295 Id. at 582.
2961d. at 584.
297/d. at 568, 585.
29R 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
2991d. at 435.
300 2001 Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 356, 366 (2001). See also Gershowitz, supra note 26,
at 1284 ("[T]here is some evidence that [Gore] not only provides lower courts with the opportunity to
strike down punitive damages awards, but also that it encourages them to do so.").
301 Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of Punitive Damages Awards in
Published Opinions, the Impact ofBMW v. Gore on Punitive Damages Award.v. and Forecasting Which
Punitive Damages Award.v Will Be Reduced, 7 SUP. Cr. ECON. REV. 59 (1999) (concluding that Gore
has not resulted in a significant increase in the number of cases in which courts strike or reduce punitive
damages awards).
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necessarily have considerable flexibility in determining the level of
punitive damages that they will allow in different classes of cases and in
any particular case.,,302 The Court conceded that the State of Alabama has
an interest in protecting consumers in its state from a company's failure to
disclose presale repairs to a car, yet held that the award was nonetheless
excessive. Thus, the Court affirmed the importance of federalism and state
sovereignty, but ultimately determined that our federalist system includes a
substantive limit on punitive damages. This seems consistent with prior
cases such as TXO Production Corp., where the Court stated, "a judgment
that [was] a product of Ja fair] process [was] entitled to a strong
presumption of validity," 30 but was not entitled to absolute validity and
was still subject to review.
The Gore Court also reviewed the important ~urposes served by
punitive damages, namely deterrence and retribution. 04 These goals are
related to the first "guidepost," the examination of the "degree of
reprehensibility" of the defendant's conduct,305 and bear a remarkable
resemblance to considerations involved in criminal punishments. In fact,
the majority opinion cites the criminal case Solem v. Helm306 to support the
"principle that punishment should fit the crime 'is deeply rooted and
frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence.",307 The Court also
refers to Solem when it justifies considering the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, noting that "some wrongs are more blameworthy than
others.,,308 Interestingly, as in the forfeiture case, Bajakajian,309 the Court
does not cite to the more recent criminal proportionality case, Harmelin v.
Michigan.3lO In examining BMW's culpability, the Court emphasized the
following: the fact that BMW failed to disclose the presale refinishing of
the car inflicted "purel~ economic harm" on Dr. Gore, and did not pose any
risk of physical harm. II Furthermore, BMW's conduct did not involve
"deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment
of evidence of improper motive," as were present in other cases.312 The
302 Gore, 517 U.S. at 568.
303 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993). But see Gore, at 598
(Scalia, 1., dissenting) (stating that "a state trial procedure that commits the decision whether to impose
punitive damages, and the amount, to the discretion of the jury, subject to some judicial review for
'reasonableness,' furnishes a defendant with all the process that is due"); id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for "unnecessarily and unwisely ventur[ing] into territory
traditionally within the States' domain").
304 Gore, 517 U.S. at 568; Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,19 (1991) ("punitive damages are imposed for the
purposes of retribution and deterrence"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
30S Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
306 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (finding that a life sentence without the possibility of parole was
disproportionate to the offense of "uttering a 'no account check,''' even though this was the defendant's
seventh offense).
307 Gore, 517 U.S. at 576 n.24 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 284 (1983».
308/d. at 575.
309 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), discussed supra notes 233, 238 and
accompanying text.
310 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
311 Gore, 517 U.S. at 576.
312/d. at 579.
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mere failure to disclose the act, and the nature and effect of the harm, led
the Court to conclude that BMW's conduct was not "egregiously
improper,,313 enough to justify an award of two million dollars in punitive
damages. Thus, the Court engaged in a rather individualized assessment of
BMW's conduct.
The Court then considered the ratio between the compensatory
damages and the punitive damages award. This test most closely resembles
the Solem Court's consideration of the harshness of the criminal sentence.
The Court noted that it has consistently eschewed the idea that "the
constitutional limit [on punitive damages] is marked by a simple
mathematical formula,,314 but stated that "exemplary damages must bear a
'reasonable relationship' to compensatory damages.,,315 This inquiry thus
used the size of the compensatory damages as a way of evaluating the
injury inflicted and comparing this to the prior "guidepost," focusing on the
culpability of the defendant. The Court concluded that in most cases "the
ratio will be within a constitutionally acceptable range .... When the ratio
is a breathtaking 500 to 1, however, the award must surely 'raise a
suspicious judicial eyebrow. ",316
In some ways, this "guidepost" resembles the threshold consideration
pronounced by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin. After considering the
seriousness of Harmelin's crime, Justice Kennedy concluded that the
offense was indeed grave, thus justifying the life sentence. Justice
Kennedy then stated that a comparison of the sentence to other crimes
inside and outside the jurisdiction was "appropriate only in the rare case in
which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence
imposed lead to an inference of gross disproportionality.,,317 Conversely, in
Gore, the idea of reasonable proportionality was not a threshold
consideration. The Court did not state that it engaged in a comparative
analysis only because the punitive damages award was, as a threshold
matter, "grossly disproportionate.,,318
Finally, as alluded to above, the last "guidepost" considered by the
Gore Court involved a comparison of the punitive damages award to other
sanctions for comparable misconduct. The Court examined statutory fines
imposed for similar conduct both within the relevant state and in other
states, as well as possible criminal sanctions.319 In Gore, the Court found
that statuto~ civil penalties for deceptive trade practices run from $2,000
to $10,000.3 0 The Court was not persuaded by the argument that the two
million dollars punitive damages award was necessary to deter misconduct,
313 {d. at 580.
314 {d. at 582.
31S {d. at 580 (citations omitted).
316 {d. at 583 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
317 Hannelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
31R Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-74.
319 ld. at 583-84.
320 {d. at 584.
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finding that "there [was] no basis for assuming that a more modest sanction
would not have been sufficient to motivate full compliance.,,321 This rather
oblique finding seems to indicate that the Court is willing to evaluate the
means used by the state to achieve the goal of deterring improper conduct,
not only as to punitive damage awards but also as to the size of such
awards.
Although a majority of the Court agreed that the two million dollars in
punitive damages was "grossly excessive," three of the Justices joined in a
concurring opinion which emphasized how the procedure used in Alabama
did not sufficiently guide the jug's discretion as to the amount of punitive
damages that were appropriate.3 Justice Breyer concluded that it was the
lack of clear standards to guide the jury as to the amount of punitive
damages awards, as well as the severe disproportionality of the award, that
"taken together overcome [the] strong presumption of validity."m Thus,
the concurring Justices seemed to prefer an approach that critically
evaluates the process by which punitive damages are awarded in addition to
the actual punitive damages a court awards. This is somewhat problematic
in Gore because the Court had previously approved Alabama's
procedure.324
Parts I and II of this article have pointed to a number of similarities
among different types of punishments-the death penalty, terms of
imprisonment, forfeitures, and punitive damages awards. These sections
have also demonstrated how the Supreme Court is much more deferential
when evaluating terms of imprisonment than when reviewing monetary
sanctions. The next part of this article argues that such an approach is not
justified.
III. THE 2002-2003 SUPREME COURT TERM
During the current Supreme Court Term, the Court had an opportunity
to set out a unitary standard for evaluating proportionality in the context of
terms of imprisonment and punitive damages awards. As seemed likely,
the Supreme Court struck the $145 million punitive damages award in State
Farm and, thus, continues to scrutinize monetary punishments more
carefully than punishments that deprive individuals of their liberty. Just as
neither the Ewing nor Andrade decisions confronted this inconsistency,
Justice Kennedy's opinion in State Farm does not address it either.
32. Id. at 585.
322Id. at 588 (Breyer, 1., concurring, with O'Connor, J., and Souter, J.,joining).
323Id. at 597 (Breyer, J., concurring).
324 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I, 20 (1991) ("These [jury] instructions ...
reasonably accommodate [the defendant's] interest in rational decision-making and Alabama's interest
in meaningful individualized assessment of appropriate deterrence and retribution.").
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A. THE ANDRADE AND EWING CASES
The story of these two cases begins with California's "Three Strikes
and You're Out" law.325 The impetus for California's Three Strikes law is
commonly traced back to a crime no one, especially no Californian can
forget.326 In 1993, twelve year old Polly Klaas was kidnapped at knife-
point from her suburban home327 in Petaluma by Richard Allen Davis.328
He later strangled her and left her body at an abandoned lumber mill.329
Davis was a career criminal and had been paroled after serving only half of
a sixteen year sentence just three months before abducting Polly.330
Revelation of Davis' criminal history, which included two other
kidnappings, spurred a cry for "three strikes" legislation-a law that would
ensure long prison sentences for repeat offenders.33I The legislature had
recently rejected such legislation, but the Klaas abduction and murder
fueled support.332 The voters also responded by voting in favor of a three
strikes initiative.333 While California has not been the only jurisdiction to
325 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2003). The voters approved an initiative creating a similar
statute. Proposition 184, in California Ballot Pamphlet: General Election: November 8, 1994, at 64,
codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 2003).
326 The Polly Klaas abduction and murder encouraged proponents of three strikes legislation to try
again. Mike Reynolds, father of Kimber Reynolds who was gunned down at the age of eighteen,
drafted the initial "Three Strikes And You're Out" legislation. See Erik G. Luna, Three Strikes in a
Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1,4 (1998).
327 See 1994 Recent Legislation: California Enacts Enhancements for Prior Felony Convictions,
107 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2123 (1994) (noting that the crime took place "in a quiet middle-class
neighborhood-not the typical crime scene in a state numbed to violence in poor and minority
communities").
328 Luna, supra note 326, at 4. For additional information on the history of three strikes
legislation, see Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three Strikes'
Overblown Promises, 90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 260-67 (2002) (book review); Rebecca Gross, The "Spirit"
ofthe Three Strikes Law: From the Romero Myth to the Hopeful Implications ofAndrade, 32 GoLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 169, 175 (2002) (describing the involvement of the Klaas family in passing
Proposition 184 and how they later attempted to defeat the initiative when they learned that it would
punish burglary as harshly as assault and rape); Renee R. Ross, Eighth Amendment: Andrade v.
Attorney General of the State of California, 32 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 95, 98-99 and accompanying
notes (2002); James A. Ardaiz, California:~ Three Strikes Law: History, Expectations, Consequences,
32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 1-7 (2000); (discussing the history and the objectives of the three strikes
legislation); Nkechi Taifa, 1J0ient Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994: "Three-Strikes-
And-You're-Out" Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third Time Felons, 20 DAYTON L. REV. 717 (1995)
(focusing mainly on federal three strikes legislation); Robert Heglin, A Flurry ofRecidivist Legislation
Means: "Three Strikes and You're Out," 20 J. LEGIS. 213,214-215 (exploring other factors that spurred
such legislation).
329 Gross, supra note 328, at 170.
330 Luna, supra note 326, at 4.
331 California already had a habitual criminal statute. See llene M. Shinbein, "Three Strikes and
l'rm're Out ": A Good Political Slogan to Reduce Crime, But a Failure in its Application, 22 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 175 (1996) (Section III A(2) discusses the provisions of Proposition
8, passed in 1982, which added section 667, entitled "Habitual Criminals," to the Penal Code).
332 See Luna, supra note 326, at 5.
333 A discussion of the pros and cons of "three strikes" legislation is beyond the scope of this
article, as is an examination of whether this legislation has been effective in reducing violent crime in
California. See Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure ~r California:~ 'Three Strikes
and You're Out' Law, II STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 65 (2000); Luna, supra note 326, at 12-20, 20-32
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enact "three strikes" legislation, its provisions differ substantially from
those of other jurisdictions.334 First, in California a defendant with one
prior "serious felont335 receives a five year enhancement for each such
prior serious felony. 36 In addition, after two serious or violent felonies, the
third, "triggering" felony need not be either violent or serious.337
As described earlier, in Andrade v. Attorney General of State of
California,338 the Ninth Circuit struck an indeterminate life sentence
without the possibility of parole for fifty :Jears for Andrade who was
convicted of two counts of petty theft.3 Andrade shoplifted five
videotapes worth $84.70 and two weeks later shoplifted another four
videotapes worth $68.84.340 Although petty theft is considered a
misdemeanor in California, punishable by up to six months,341 Andrade
received this sentence because he was convicted of "petty theft with a
prior."342 This offense is known as a "wobbler," which means that it can be
(setting out arguments for and against three strikes, respectively); Ardaiz, supra note 328, at 3-7
(arguing that three strikes deters criminals from committing further crimes and achieves the goals of
rehabilitation, retribution and incapacitatioJl): Heglin, supra note 328, at 215-18 (evaluating the
arguments for three strikes legislation). See also Vitiello, supra note 328, at 268-80 (evaluating the
effects of three strikes legislation based on empirical evidence in book reviewed by the author);
Shinbein, supra note 291, at 193 (stating that Califomia's Three Strikes law is "more of a headache than
a deterrent or remedy... [because it] does not distinguish between violent and non-violent felons"). But
see Brian P. Janiskee & Edward J. Erher, Crime, Punishment and Romero: An Analysis of the Case
Against California s Three Strikes Law, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 43, 53 (2000) (critiquing the study described
by Vitiello and concluding that the decline in the crime rate was sharper after Three Strikes); Bill Jones,
Why the Three Strikes Law is Working in California, II STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 23 (1999) (as the title
suggests, the author, Secretary of State for the State of California, who was involved in drafting the
three strikes legislation, concludes that the law has been effective in deterring crime.). For a more
theoretical analysis of habitual criminal sentence enhancements in the context of theories of
punishment, see Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment. 43 BUFFALO L.
REV. 689 (1995).
334 Vitiello, supra note 328, at 261-62. See also Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Habitual
Offender Statutes and Criminal Deterrence, 34 CONN. L. REV. 55 (2002) ("The harshest of the Three
Strikes laws was enacted by the California Legislature in 1994.").
335 A "violent felony" is defined at CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (WEST 2003); a "serious felony" is
defined at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) and mirrors § 667.5(c) (WEST 2003).
336 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a)(I)-(b) (WEST 2003).
337 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (WEST 2003) ("If a defendant has two or more prior felony
convictions as defined in subdivision (d) [violent or serious] ... the term for the current felony
conviction shall be an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence [of twenty-five years]."). This section does not state that the third felony must
be violent or serious. See also In re Cervera, 24 Cal. 4th 1073, 1075 (2001) ("The Three Strikes law
governs when a defendant is convicted of a felony or 'strike' of any kind.").
338 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 200 I).
339 [d. at 765--66.
340 [d. at 749.
341 CAL. PENAL CODE § 487(a) (WEST 2003) (defining grand theft as theft over $400).
342 CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (WEST 2003) (providing that where a defendant has been convicted of
certain offenses, such as "petty theft, grand theft, auto theft[,] ... burglary, ca~acking, [or] robbery,"
and "is subsequently convicted of petty theft" that person is "punishable by imprisonment in the county
jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison"). Punishment up to one year in the county jail is
considered a misdemeanor, while a sentence to be served in state prison is a felony. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 17(b) (WEST 2003); People v. Alvarez, 14 Cal. 4th 968 (1997) (discussing prosecutor's discretion to
treat certain offenses as misdemeanors).
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tried as either a misdemeanor or a felony, in the discretion of the prosecutor
or judge.343 The prosecutor elected to charge the two petty thefts with a
prior as felonies. Andrade had three burgla!;¥ convictions in 1983. These
were charged as his first and second strikes,34 and the two petty thefts with
a prior were his third and fourth strikes.345 Upon conviction, Andrade was
sentenced to twenty-five years to life for each petty theft with a prior
conviction, to be served consecutively.346 As the Ninth Circuit panel noted,
"Andrade will not become eligble for parole until 2046, after serving 50
years; he will be 87 years old." 47 The Ninth Circuit engaged in a detailed
and extensive analysis and concluded that "Andrade's sentence is so
grossly disproportionate to his crime that it violates the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.,,348
In Ewing v. California,349 Ewing received a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole for twenty-five years for shoplifting three golf clubs.
This crime constituted Ewing's third strike350 because the prosecutor chose
to charge this offense as a felony rather than as a misdemeanor, triggering
California's three strikes statute.351 Ewing will be eligible for parole in
2025, when he is sixty-three.352 His sentence has not received the type of
review that Andrade's did. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the
343 See Ardaiz, supra note 328, at 20; People v. Martinez, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1502, 1510 (CI. App.
1999) (acknowledging that the two offenses involved in that case, possession of a small amount of
methamphetamine and "attempting by threat to deter an executive office from out his or her duty" are
"both wobblers" and "can be treated as either a felony of a misdemeanor"); People v. Archie, 2001 WL
1649290, at *4 (Cal. App. Dec. 26, 200 I) (acknowledging that selling a substance in lieu of a controlled
substance is a "wobbler" and that the judge could have treated the offense as a misdemeanor). A judge
also has discretion to strike prior offenses that would otherwise count as "prior felonies" for purposes of
the "three strikes" statute. People v. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th 497 (1996). However, this has been
significantly narrowed by People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 4th 148 (1998). See Gross, supra note 328, at
180-81 (criticizing standard for exercise of such discretion because it involves "amorphous concepts
such as 'in the furtherance of justice' ... [and] 'within the spirit of Three Strikes [law]"); Shamica
Doty, A Trial Court:, Misunderstanding ofthe Scope of its Discretion to Strike Priors Under the Three
Strikes Law Can Result in Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 3 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 17 (2001)
(lamenting the confusion surrounding the standard that trial courts are to use when deciding whether to
strike a prior qualifying felony under the three strikes law).
344 Burglary is considered a serious felony under the three strikes statute. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 667.5 (WEST 2003).
345 Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 2001).
346 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(6) (WEST 2003) ("If there is a current conviction for more than
one felony count not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative
facts, the court shall sentence the defendant consecutively on each count pursuant to subdivision (e).")
(emphasis added).
347 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750.
348 Id. at 766.
349 People v. Ewing, 2001 Cal. LEXIS 4704 (Cal. July 11,2001).
350 Ewing's prior strikes were three burglary convictions and a single robbery conviction involved
in one of the burglaries. Even though two of the burglaries did not involve violence, they are
considered serious or violent under the three strikes statute. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Ewing v.
California, 2001 LEXIS 4704 (Cal App. July 11,2001) (No. 01-6978).
351 In contrast to the third strike in Andrade, which was a "wobbler" because of Andrade's prior
record, Ewing's third strike, grand theft, is a "wobbler" regardless of his prior criminal record. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 489 (b) (WEST 2003).
)52 Brieffor Petitioner at 5-6, Ewing, 2001 LEXIS 4704.
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sentence in an unpublished opinion and the California Supreme Court
summarily denied his petition for review.353
These sentences are not aberrations. It is estimated that about 340-350
of the approximately 7000 inmates serving sentences under California's
Three Strikes statute committed misdemeanors that the prosecutor chose to
bump up to felonies. This gave those defendants a third felonis and brought
them within the scope of California's Three Strikes statute. 54 Examples
include the "cookie thief' who received a life sentence and will not be
eligible for parole for twenty-five years,355 a "pizza thief,,,356 a defendant
who attempted to steal a steering wheel alarm worth $25,357 one who
shoplifted a bottle of vitamins,358 an inmate who shoplifted five bottles of
shampoo,359 and another who shoplifted a roast beef worth $19.360
In Andrade, the Ninth Circuit noted the fractured Harmelin decision,
and that a majority of justices favored proportionality review.361 The court
also pointed out that Harmelin left the Solem opinion intact,362 Applying
the Kennedy approach, the court engaged in a lengthy "threshold
comparison" of the severity of the punishment and the seriousness of the
offense and concluded that it led "to an inference that Andrade's sentence
was grossly disproportionate.,,363 According to the court, while Andrade's
sentence was essentially the same as the ones imposed on Harmelin and
Solem, his offense was not as serious as that of Harmelin, but more like
Solem's offense of "uttering a no account check.,,364 Upon satisfying the
threshold evaluation of gross disproportionality, the court then applied the
other factors considered in Solem, which are analyzed in Part I.B of this
article.
The Ninth Circuit Andrade court pointed out that Andrade's life
sentence with the possibility of parole in fifty years was "exceeded in
353 Id. at 1.
354 Durden v. California, 531 U.S. 1184 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting from denial ofcert.); Tavis
Smiley, Supreme Court Looks at Constitutionality of California s Three-Strikes Law (National Public
Radio Broadcast, November 6, 2002) (Interview with Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Professor of Law,
UCLA); Nina Totenberg, Morning Edition (National Public Radio Broadcast, November 5, 2002)
(Interview with Erwin Chemerinsky, Professor of Law, USC); see also Ardaiz, supra note 328, at 16
("It is true that 5.0% of such third-strike offenders and 9.9% of second-strike offenders fall within the
Three Strikes law because their triggering offense is a crime such as petty theft with a prior.").
355 Stuart Pfeifer & Jack Leonard, Court Upholds 3-Strikes Term for Cookie Thief, L.A. TIMES,
June 19,2001, at Part 2, B7.
356 Id. However, the judge exercised discretion in lowering the sentence.
357 Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2002) (court found the sentence unconstitutional).
358 Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999) (Stevens, J., explaining denial of certiorari). In some
cases, the defendant was convicted of petty theft with a prior, but the court did not include the facts
regarding the petty theft in its opinion. See. e.g., People v. Murphy, 88 Cal. App. 4th 392, 393 (Ct. App.
2001) (taking "judicial notice" of unpublished opinion as to the same defendant and conviction).
359 Three-Strikes Convicts Biding Time, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Apr. 6, 2002, available
at 2002 WL 5445372.
360 Id.
361 Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 757 (9th Cir. 2001).
3621d. at 758.
363 Id. at 761.
364 Id. at 758-59
264 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 12:217
California only by first-degree murder and a select few other crimes.,,365
These crimes are punishable by death or by life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. The court pointed out that Andrade's punishment was
more severe than the sentences of those who committed violent offenses.
For example, rape is punishable bJ up to eight years,366 and second degree
murder by fifteen years to life.3 Even in light of Andrade's criminal
record, the court concluded that the sentence was grossly disproportionate.
In particular, the court seemed concerned by the fact that the length of
Andrade's sentence was twice as long as that of other defendants with
similar crimes.368
Comparing Andrade's sentence with possible sentences in other
jurisdictions, the court determined that Andrade's petty theft with a prior
would serve as a triggering offense under the recidivist statutes of only four
other states?69 However~ in those states, Andrade would not have received
such a severe sentence.3 0 The court concluded that its intra- and inter-
jurisdictional analyses "validate[d] [its] initial judgment that [Andrade's]
sentence is grossly disproportionate ... to [his] crime.,,371
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in
Andrade, allowing the life sentence with the possibility of parole in 50
years to stand.372 The Court also allowed Ewing's life sentence with the
possibility of parole in 25 years to stand.373 Justice O'Connor wrote the
opinions for the five-justice majority in each case. The opinions in these
cases are revealing in at least two significant respects. First, in Andrade,
the Court indicates that although it has never expressly overruled Solem,
and has, in fact, maintained that Solem survived Harmelin, state courts may
disregard it when analyzing an excessive punishment challenge.374 While
this was in the context of concluding that Andrade failed to meet the
statutory standard for federal habeas corpus review, it is nonetheless
instructive of what a majority of justices think about the continued
relevance of Solem. Second, the Ewirw opinion confirms what many
commentators have said since Harmelin.3 That is, while a majority of the
Court concludes that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause contains a
365 Id. at 761.
366 CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (WEST 2003).
367 CAL. PENAL CODE § 193 (WEST 2003).
36. 270 F.3d at 762.
369 Id. These states are Rhode Island, West Virginia, Texas, and Louisiana.
370 In Rhode Island, Andrade's theft of the videotapes would not have constituted a felony, even
with his prior convictions. The West Virginia Supreme Court has held that a life sentence imposed on a
non-violent recidivist offender violates the state Constitution. In Texas, even if Andrade could receive a
possible sentence of forty years, he would be eligible for parole in ten years. 270 F.3d at 763-64.
"Although it is possible that Andrade could have qualified for a sentence under Louisiana's Habitual
Offender Law comparable to the sentence he received under California's Three Strikes law, there is a
distinct possibility, unlike in California, that a Louisiana court might have invalidated such a sentence
as excessive under its state constitution." Id. at 765.
371Id. at 765 (quoting Hannelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991».
372 Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003).
373 Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1190 (2003).
374 Andrade, 123 S. Ct. at 1173-74.
375 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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proportionality principle, the test implementing this principle essentially
guts it, resulting in no constitutional limit on the amount of time a
government may lock up a criminal.
In Andrade a majority of the Court implicitly concludes that Solem,
the only recene76 Supreme Court decision finding a term of imprisonment
unconstitutional, is tangential, if relevant at all, to proportionality review.377
The Court held that the state court decision analyzing proportionality is not
"contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l), thus foreclosing habeas corpus relief.378
The Ninth Circuit had determined that Andrade satisfied the habeas
standard because the state court did not apply Solem. The state court
concluded that Solem "is questionable in light of' Harmelin, and therefore
reviewed Andrade's Eighth Amendment claim under Rummel and not
Solem.379 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on this point,
emphasizing that the Court's jurisprudence in the area of proportionality of
criminal sentences has "not been a model of clarity.,,38o The Court also
states that the facts in Andrade "fall in between the facts in Rummel and the
facts in Solem.,,381 Yet, the Court holds that since the facts of Andrade are
distinguishable from Solem, the state court's decision was not contrary to
principles set out in Supreme Court precedent. The significance of this
procedural point is that the Court condones a state court's disregard of
precedent that, while distinguishable, is nonetheless relevant. If the facts of
Andrade fall between the facts of two Supreme Court cases, it would be
reasonable for the state court to compare the Andrade facts to both Rummel
and Solem and decide which case Andrade resembles the most. But the
Court concludes that unless a case before the state court is materially
indistinguishable from Supreme Court precedent, a state court is free to
disregard it. It is difficult to see how this leaves any room for habeas
corpus review of proportionality challenges.
As to the second point, Justice O'Connor concludes that Ewing's life
sentence is not grossly disproportionate and, thus, the Court need not
engage in any comparative analysis. This conclusion is based on both an
evaluation of the seriousness of the offense and the fact that Ewing had a
criminal record. Similar to the analysis in Harmelin, the Court in Ewing
determined that shoplifting $1,200 worth of property was more serious than
376 See supra note 75.
371 Andrade, 123 S. Ct. at 1173-74.
378 ld. at 1172, 1175. A discussion of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) and habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)( 1) is beyond the scope of this article.
For recent discussions of these issues see A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of "New
Rules" and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2002); Todd
E. Pettys, Federal Habeas Relief and the New Tolerance for "Reasonably Erroneous" Applications of
Federal Law, 63 OHIO ST. LJ. 731 (2002); Adam M. Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners: How Should AEDPA s Standard of Review Operate After Williams v.
Taylor?, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1493; Ronn Gehring, Note, Tyler v. Cain: A Fork in the Path For Habeas
Corpus or the End ofthe Roadfor Collateral Review?, 36 AKRON L. REV. 181 (2002); Claudia Wilner,
Note, "We Would Not Defer to That Which Did Not Exist": AEDPA Meets the Silent State Court
Opinion, 77 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1442 (2002).
379 Andrade, 123 S. Ct. at 1171-72.
38°1d. at 1173.
381 ld. at 1174.
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the "passive" offense involved in Solem.382 It is likely that in the vast
majority of proportionality challenges, a reviewing court will easily
conclude that the offense is more serious than the offense at issue in Solem,
making it difficult to conceive of a term of imprisonment that would violate
the proportionality principle set out in Ewing. The Court emphasizes that it
has consistently upheld the ability of states to impose harsher sentences on
repeat offenders. Ewing did not challenge the general constitutionality of
the Three Strikes law. Therefore, the Court's elaboration on the
constitutionality of habitual offender statutes is not an analysis of the
proportionality question raised in this case. Indeed, it seems that the Court
will uphold any term of imprisonment under a three strikes or other
habitual offender law. Justice O'Connor's opinion does not explain why
the fact that a criminal defendant is a recidivist justifies just about any term
of imprisonment. Perhaps the answer lies in the seriousness of the offense.
Justice O'Connor specifically points to statistics showing that "property
offenders like Ewing had higher recidivism rates than those released after
committing violent, drug, or public-order offenses.... 73 percent of the
propertis offenders released in 1994 were arrested again within three
years." 83 However, these statistics do not answer the question of the
seriousness of a non-violent theft offense. Rather, these statistics support
the fact that recidivism among property offenders is a problem. According
to this analysis, if statistics showed that there is a high recidivism rate
among drivers who exceed speeding limits, or violate other traffic laws,
perhaps even parking laws, any term of imprisonment would not violate the
Constitution, because the state could show that recidivism among traffic
law offenders is a problem. It is not clear how a non-violent property
offense, one which could have been treated as a misdemeanor, is serious
enough to justify a life sentence, even when it was committed by a repeat
offender. Yet, the Court concludes that such a long sentence is not grossly
disproportionate in such a situation, thus dispensing of any need to consider
other factors relevant to proportionality. As Justice Breyer points out in his
dissent, the "threshold test" set out in Harmelin "must permit arguably
unconstitutional sentences, not only actually unconstitutional sentences
•.•,,384 Instead, the majority's application of this test amounts to a
"determinative test" not a threshold test.385 Treating Justice Kennedy's
threshold inquiry in Harmelin as a determinative test, and finding that
problems of recidivism justify practically any term of imprisonment, results
in no constitutional limit on terms of imprisonment.
It is particularly interesting that Justice O'Connor wrote the decisions
upholding the prison sentences in Andrade and Ewing. Justice O'Connor
has been one of the most vocal members of the Court favoring greater
judicial scrutiny of punitive damages awards. Beginning with her dissent
in Browning-Ferris, Justice O'Connor has consistently written about the
need to protect corporations and other entities from excessive punitive
3M2 Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1189 (2003).
3M31d. at 1188.
3!l4 Id. at 1197 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
3Ml Id.
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damages awards. To support her argument she has relied on the fact that
such awards "serve the same purposes-punishment and deterrence-as
the criminal law.,,386 Thus she acknowledges significant similarities
between terms of imprisonment and punitive damages awards. She has
cited to Solem to support her statement that, "[d]ue process requires, at
some level, that punishment be commensurate with the wrongful
conduct.,,387 She also relied on criminal precedent to justify federal judicial
review ofpunitive damages, stating:
Judicial intervention in cases of excessive awards also has the critical
function of ensuring that another ancient and fundamental principle of
justice is observed-that the punishment be proportionate to the offense.
As we have observed, the requirement of proportionality is "deeply rooted
and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence.,,388
Justice O'Connor has even suggested that the Court should look to
Solem in devising a method for evaluating punitive damages awards for
possible excessiveness as her dissenting opinion in Browning-Ferris
illustrates:
Determining whether a particular award of punitive damages is excessive
is not an easy task. The proportionality framework that the Court has
adopted under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, however,
offers some broad guidelines.... I would adapt the Solem framework to
punitive damages in the following manner. First, the reviewing court
must accord "substantial deference" to legislative judgments concerning
appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue. Second, the court should
examine the gravity of the defendant's conduct and the harshness of the
award of punitive damages. Third, because punitive damages are penal in
nature, the court should compare the civil and criminal penalties imposed
in the same jurisdiction for different types of conduct, and the civil and
criminal penalties imposed by different jurisdictions for the same or
similar conduct. In identifying the relevant civil penalties, the court
should consider not only the amount of awards of punitive damages but
also statutory civil sanctions. In identifying the relevant criminal
penalties, the court should consider not only the possible monetary
sanctions, but also any possible prison term.389
Thus, Justice O'Connor would include a comparative analysis in her
evaluation of punitive damages awards, yet she eschewed any such analysis
in Ewing. The same year Justice O'Connor joined Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Harmelin, she once again voiced her concerns about
excessive punitive damages awards. In Haslip, she began her dissenting
opinion with the following: "Punitive damages are a powerful weapon.
Imposed wisely and with restraint, they have the potential to advance
386 Browning-Ferris Indus. ofVt. v. Kelco, 492 U.S. 257, 287 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
387 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
388 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 478 (O'Connor, 1., dissenting)
(citin9Solem).89 Kelco, 492 U.S. at 300-01 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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legitimate state interests. Imposed indiscriminately, however, they have a
devastating potential for harm. ,,390
Certainly the harm created by disproportionate terms of imprisonment
is at least as devastating as excessive punitive damages awards. In
addition, Andrade's and Ewing's respective sentences under California's
Three Strikes law are hardly models of restraint.
In Has/ip, as in Browning-Ferris, Justice O'Connor once again
emphasized the similarity between punitive damages awards and criminal
sanctions.
Compounding the problem, punitive damages are quasi-criminal
punishment. Unlike compensatory damages, which serve to allocate an
existing loss between two parties, punitive damages are specifically
designed to exact punishment in excess of actual harm to make clear that
the defendant's misconduct was especially reprehensible. Hence, there is
a stigma attached to an award of punitive damages that does not
accompany a purely compensatory award. The punitive character of
punitive damages means that there is more than just money at stake. This
factor militates in favor of strong procedural safeguards.391
The loss of liberty associated with a term of imprisonment is at least as
significant as any stigma associated with a punitive damages award. This
again illustrates the need for a consistent standard for evaluating any type
of punishment for excessiveness. The above quotes from Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinions in cases reviewing punitive damages
awards bolster the argument that courts should evaluate terms of
imprisonment at least as carefully as they review punitive damages
awards. Justice O'Connor missed an opportunity in Ewing to correct an
inconsistency that she has relied on in the past-both terms of
imprisonment and punitive damages awards are forms of punishment and
serve the same goals of retribution and deterrence. Justice O'Connor
silently joined the majority opinion striking the punitive damages award in
State Farm; thus, it is impossible to know how she justifies a different and
more deferential review of prison sentences.
B. THE CAMPBELL CASE
The Campbell case has its roots in an automobile accident, which
occurred over twenty years ago, on May 22, 1981.392 Curtis Campbell
unsafely passed a car driven by Robert Slusher, forcing another car, driven
by Todd Ospital, to veer onto the shoulder of the road and collide with
Slusher's car.393 Ospital died at the scene and Slusher was left disabled.394
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company insured Campbell, and
his policy provided $25,000 of coverage for each person injured in an
390 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 42 (O'Connor, j" dissenting).
391 Id. at 54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added),
392 Campbell v. Sate Farm Mut. Auto. Ins, Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 200 I).
393 Id.
394 Id.
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accident, up to a maximum of $50,000 of coverage per accident.395 Slusher
sued both Campbell and Ospital's estate, and Ospital then cross-claimed
Campbel1.396 Slusher entered into a settlement agreement with Ospital's
estate.397 The attorneys for Slusher and for Ospital's estate offered to settle
their claims against Campbell with State Farm for the policy limits.398
State Farm, however, refused to settle and continued to reject settlement
offers made before and after the lawsuit by Slusher and Ospital began.399
The facts, as described by the Utah Supreme Court, indicate that one of
State Farm's investigators, Ray Summers, had submitted a report with
evidence that Campbell was at fault.40o State Farm rejected this report and
ordered Summers to change his description of the accident and his
conclusion that the claims against Campbell were strong.401
State Farm hired an attorney, Wendell Bennett, who had done work for
State Farm in the past, to represent the Campbells.402 Bennett reassured
both Campbell and his wife, Inez Campbell, that they did not need to seek
separate counsel4 that he would represent their interests, and that theirassets were safe. 03 At Campbell's trial the jury found Campbell 100% at
fault for the accident and awarded Slusher $135,000 and Ospital's estate
$50,849, awards which exceeded Campbell's policy limit of $50,000.404
After the verdict, State Farm refused to post a bond, pending appeal, in
excess of the policy limit, and Bennett suggested to the Campbells that they
put "for sale" signs on their property, making it clear that State Farm would
not pay the excess judgment against the Campbells.405 The Campbells then
retained other counsel and entered into an agreement with Slusher and
Ospital that provided, in part, that Slusher and Ospital would not seek
satisfaction on their judgment against the Campbells.406 In exchange, the
Campbells would pursue a bad faith action against State Farm and pay a
portion of any money recovered from State Farm to Slusher and to
Ospital's estate.407 After the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
against Campbell,408 State Farm paid the entire award to Slusher and
Ospita1.409
Shortly after State Farm paid the judgments against Campbell, he and
his wife filed an action against State Farm alleging bad faith, fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a claim for punitive
395 Jd. at 1141 n.2.
396 Jd. at 1141.
397 Jd. at 1142.










40R Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989).
409 Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1142.
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damaftes.41o At the request of State Farm, the trial court bifurcated the
trial.4 In phase one, the jury determined that State Farm had acted
unreasonably and in bad faith when it failed to settle the claims against
Campbell because there was a substantial likelihood that a verdict against
him would exceed his policy limits.412 At the conclusion of phase two, the
jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and
$145 million in punitive damages, but the trial court ordered a remittitur of
the awards to $1 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in
punitive damages.413 The trial court stated that it remitted the punitive
damages award because it believed that state precedent placed a legal limit
on the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages.414 On appeal,
the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages
award against State Farm after reviewing the issue of excessiveness under a
de novo standard, pursuant to Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group. 415
The Utah Supreme Court reinstated the jury's original $145 million
punitive damages award in reliance on the trial court's detailed and
extensive findings that State Farm had "engaged in a pattern of 'trickery
and deceit,' 'false statements,' and other 'acts of affirmative misconduct'"
against "'financially vulnerable' persons.,,416 The evidence included
nationwide conduct by State Farm that spanned more than twenty years.417
There are at least two problems with such evidence. First, is the earlier
criticism of Justice Kennedy's opinions in Harmelin and Bajakajian about
his reliance on facts not proven by the prosecution and facts unrelated to
the charges against the defendants to support the punishments imposed.
Even if the proof of State Farm's other conduct meets the civil standard, the
second concern remains. This concern is whether it is appropriate for a
court in one state to consider, for purposes of imposing punitive damages, a
defendant's conduct in another state. Recently, the Ninth Circuit struck a
punitive damages award of $150 million that had been reduced by the trial
court to $69 million.418 In White v. Ford Motor Co., the Ninth Circuit was
particularly concerned that the plaintiffs argued the jury should consider
Ford's nationwide conduct when calculating punitive damages.419 The
court concluded that a jury may consider extraterritorial conduct to the
extent that it is relevant to the question of the degree of reprehensibility, but
must not punish the defendant for out-of-state conduct.420
410 {d.
411 {d.
412 {d. at 1142-43.
41J Id. at 1143.
414 Id. at 1146.
415 532 U.S. 424 (2001). A de novo standard of review does not require the reviewing court to
accord any deference to the conclusion of the lower court.
416 Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1148 (quoting BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-
67 (1996)).
417 See id. at 1148.
418 White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998 (2002).
419 See id. 1013-16.
420 Id. at 1020.
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However, it is not exactly clear whether there is a real difference
between these two. Consideration of extraterritorial evidence when
calculating punitive damages awards is analogous to consideration of a
criminal offender's prior history when applying a habitual criminal or
"three strikes" statute. Granted, as to proving prior wrongdoing of a
tortfeasor, Campbell did not impose the stringent beyond a reasonable
doubt standard reserved for criminal convictions. However, in the context
of recidivist statutes, courts are not restricted to considering only similar
criminal convictions. Yet, in Gore, White, and most recently State Farm,
evidence of other conduct included only the same conduct-failing to
disclose damage or repainting of new cars in Gore, and a defective parking
brake design and a failure to warn in White and bad faith with respect to
third party automobile insurance claims in State Farm. Indeed, Justice
Kennedy's opinion in State Farm specifies that other conduct considered
for determining an award of punitive damages "must have a nexus to the
specific harm suffered by the plaintiff," thus narrowing the type of conduct
a plaintiff may present to the jury.421 In the context of terms of
imprisonment, in a case like Rummel v. Estelle,422 it seems that the nature of
the defendant's prior offenses is irrelevant to the issue of proportionality.
Similarly, under California's Three Strikes law, the nature of the triggering
offense (i.e., a "wobbler" charged as a felony) is, for the most' part,
immaterial to California courts. Instead, the concern is mainly with a
determination that due to the defendant's criminal history, he or she comes
"within the spirit" of the three strikes law and therefore must be punished
severely, even though Solem involved careful consideration of the nature of
the defendant's prior offenses. This raises the question of what justifies
limiting the type of prior conduct engaged in by a tortfeasor when assessing
proportionality, while permitting broad consideration of a criminal
defendant's criminal history.
The Court's discussion of the "ratio guidepost" provides some
guidance as to what ratio will likely be constitutional, but does little to
explain how a ratio is to be calculated. Some ratios are based on the
compensatory damages actually awarded, such as the one million dollars
awarded to the Campbells. Sometimes ratios are based on the plaintiff's
out-of-pocket expenses, which is how the Utah Supreme Court
characterized the ratio in Haslip.423 In TXO Production Corp., a ratio often
to one was calculated based on thetotential harm that could have resulted
from the defendant's misconduct.42 The Campbells argue that the ratio in
their case is really seventy to one once the one million dollars in
compensatory damages is added to the excess verdict against Mr.
Campbell, the attorneys' fees and expenses, and the special damages.425
Given the ease with which the ratio can be manipulated, the Court should
421 State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1522-23 (2003).
422 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
423 Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1153.
424 509 U.S. 443, 460-62 (1993).
425 Brief for the Respondents at 17 n.5, Slale Farm, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003) (No. 01-1289).
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have specified which figures should be used to calculate this number.
Aside from the mathematical question involved, the issue of the ratio is
analogous to the consideration of the harm created by a criminal defendant
and how that harm translates into a term of imprisonment. In the context of
terms of imprisonment, the consensus seems to be that courts need not
determine what punishment is strictly proportionate in relation to the harm
involved. Rather, courts are to ensure that a sentence is not grossly
disproportionate. In State Farm, the Court declined "again to impose a
bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.,,426
Nonetheless, the Court stated that "lsJingle-digit multipliers are more likely
to comport with due process ..." 2 In the context of prison terms, the
Court has not indicated any type of numerical limit, other than the
possibility that a life sentence for overtime parking might be
unconstitutional. Again, the Court does not explain or justify this
discrepancy.
Justice Kennedy does not explain in any of these three recent cases
why the Court should review punitive damages awards more carefully than
it reviews terms of imprisonment, even though Justice Kennedy wrote the
Harmelin opinion imposing a threshold requirement of "gross
disproportionality," a requirement not imposed in his opinion in State
Farm,.
IV. CONCLUSION-A PLEA FOR CONSISTENCY
Recently, the Supreme Court stated, "we have read the text of the
[Eighth A]mendment to prohibit all excessive punishments as well as cruel
and unusual punishments that mayor may not be excessive.,,428 Unless
there are compelling reasons for distinguishing among the sanctions of
death, terms of imprisonment, forfeitures, and punitive damages awards,
the method for evaluating their excessiveness or disproportionality should
be consistent. Parts I and II of this article have demonstrated that, while
the jurisprudence has been inconsistent, the weight of the precedent
indicates that such a review requires an evaluation of the considerations set
out by Justice Powell in his opinions in both Solem and Rummel, and
identified earlier in this article: the nature of the offense and the defendant's
culpability as compared to the severity of the sanction, as well as a
comparative analysis of the sentence imposed.
The nature or type of punishment imposed should not be determinative
of whether proportionality review is required, or of which standard a court
will apply. Each of these sanctions admittedly imposes a penalty on an
individual, or sometimes, in the case of punitive damages, on an entity.
The justifications for each of these penalties have been that they are needed
to further deterrence and to punish. The fact that the punishment is in the
426 Slate Farm, 123 S, Ct. at 1524,
427 {d. at 1516.
428 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 231 (2002) (finding that imposing the death penalty on
retarded criminals is unconstitutionally excessive) (emphasis added).
2003] Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality 273
fonn of death, money, property, or a tenn of imprisonment does not justify
a separate standard for each. Rather, the type of punishment imposed
should be considered in the context of the crime the defendant committed
or the improper behavior in which the defendant engaged. For example,
while certain behavior might warrant forfeiture of a significant amount of
money, similar behavior might not justify an extremely long prison
sentence.429 Similarly, particularly egregious fonns of murder can support
imposition of the death penalty, while other quite serious offenses
cannot,430 .
Furthennore, even when striking certain sanctions, the Court has relied
on a high threshold of "gross disproportionality" or excessiveness, thereby
allowing federalism and judicial deference concerns to infonn the Court's
proportionality analysis, rather than imposing a requirement of strict
proportionality. Nonetheless, the Court must not require such a high
threshold of disproportionality as to abdicate all judicial review of the
lengths of prison sentences. The Court's most recent pronouncement on
proportionality of tenns of imprisonment in Ewing is inconsistent with the
Court's rulings in State Farm, Gore, and Bajakajian. First, neither State
Farm, Gore, nor Bajakajian required a threshold detennination of "gross
disproportionality" before an analysis of other factors, such as inter- and
intra- jurisdictional comparisons. In addition, both the Gore and
Bajakajian opinions place significant emphasis on the individual
culpability of the respective defendants, as well as on the magnitude of the
hann they caused as compared to the sanction imposed. As discussed
earlier, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Harmelin considered only facts that
implied greater culpability-even though the prosecution did not prove
those facts beyond a reasonable doubt-yet completely ignored the reality
that this was the defendant's only offense. At the heart of concerns
regarding proportionality of punishments is the notion of deservedness-
the wrongdoer's culpability.43\ Considerations of an individual's
culpability should be particularly acute where the individual faces a
deprivation of liberty.
In addition to requiring a high threshold of disproportionality as to
tenns of imprisonment, the Court employs another mechanism out of
respect for federalist concerns-substantial deference to state legislatures.
In Ewing, a majority of the Court states, "[w]e do not sit as a
'superlegislature' to second-guess these policy choices. It is enough that
the State of California has a reasonable basis for believing that dramatically
enhanced sentences for habitual felons 'advance[s] the goals of [its]
criminal justice system in any substantial way. ",432 However, where other
429 In Bajakajian, the majority pointed out that under the Sentencing Guidelines, the maximum
prison sentence for failing to report currency is six months. 524 U.S. 321, 338 (\ 998). However, the
dissent points out that the specific statute criminalizing a willful violation of the reporting statute
authorizes a prison sentence of five years. Id. at 350 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
4)0 See discussion of Coker, supra notes 71, 89 and accompanying text.
4)1 See Johnson, supra note 26, at 496.
4)2 Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1189 (2003).
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constitutional rights are at issue, the Court does not always permit such a
degree of deference. The area of regulatory takings provides one example.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Court stated, "our cases
describe the condition for abridgment of property rights through the police
power as a 'substantial advanc[ing]' of a legitimate state interest.,,433
Indeed, the Court dismissed as a mere play on words the justification for
the permit condition and expressed distrust of the Coastal Commission's
motives, stating, "unless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is
not a valid regulation ofland use but'an out-and-out plan of extortion. ",434
Subsequently, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court added an additional
layer of judicial review stating, "[i]f we find that a nexus exists, we must
then decide the required degree of connection between the exactions and
the projected impact of the proposed development.,,435 The Court defines
this nexus as, "rough proportionality" requiring "the city [to] make some
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.,,436
Despite detailed and specific findings by the city as to the need for the
conditions imposed on Dolan, the Court nonetheless found an
unconstitutional taking. Certainly, a property owner challenging
governmental action as a taking is not deserving of any punishment.
However, my point is that both the property owner and the criminal are
seeking protection of important constitutional rights, protection of property
and liberty, yet the Court more closely scrutinizes governmental action
when property is at stake.437
The fact that different sections of the Constitution are implicated with
respect to these different sanctions is not a compelling reason to justify the
lack of any meaningful review of terms of imprisonment. Forfeitures and
criminal sanctions are both covered by the Eighth Amendment, but under
different clauses. While the Excessive Fines Clause is arguably explicit in
its inclusion of proportionality review, as Section LA of this article has
shown, the overwhelming majority of the relevant precedent supports
proportionality review of criminal sanctions.438 Furthermore, one
commentator has made a sound argument for requiring closer scrutiny of
433 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (citations omitted) (finding a violation of the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause where Coastal Commission imposed, as a building pennit condition, the grant of a
public easement across a private beach).
434 ld., at 838, 837.
435 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (finding a Fifth Amendment violation).
436 {d. at 391.
437 This analogy is similar to that made in Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion
Politics: Writing/or an Audience a/One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 144 (1989), where the authors argue
that if the Court requires the showing of an actual governmental purpose furthered through narrowly
tailored regulations before denying opportunities to whites, as in City ofRichmond v. 1. A. Croson Co.,
109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), then "[s]urely ... it can require nothing less before states burden women in the
exercise of their fundamental rights." Estrich & Sullivan, at 144.
43' But see Johnson, supra note 26, at 504-05.
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criminal sanctions because these involve deprivations of liberty, or possiB~
even death, and, thus, are more serious than losses of property or money.
The Supreme Court has determined that punitive damages awards are
not reviewable under the Eighth Amendment, but rather come within the
purview of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.440 The
Court's rationale was that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to
damages awards between private p.arties.441 This appears to be based on yet
another civil-criminal dichotomy.442 However, this line has begun to blur
as well. In her dissenting opinion in Gore, Justice Ginsburg included an
appendix illustrating the various types of punitive damages schemes among
the states.443 One category identifies thirteen states with statutes that
require a certain percentage of punitive damages awards be allocated to a
state agency.444 For example, Missouri law allocates fifty percent of a
punitive damages award, minus expenses and attorneys' fees to the Tort
Victims' Compensation Fund.445 Oregon allocates six~ percent of such an
award to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account. 46 Utah, the state in
which the State Farm case took place, allocates 50% of a punitive damage
award in excess of $20,000 to the state treasury,447 and, thus, stood to gain
about $62,500 if the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld the $145 million
punitive damages award against State Farm. Punitive damages awards are
no longer simply a matter between private parties; a number of state
governments stand to benefit from such awards. Thus, the justification for
excluding the amount of a punitive damages award from scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment is fading.
Just as state governments might benefit from punitive damages awards,
they also stand to gain from forfeitures of property and money.'l48 Justice
Scalia pointed to the difference between criminal sanctions and forfeitures
to justify greater judicial scrutiny offorfeitures:
There is good reason to be concerned that fines, uniquely of all
punishments, will be imposed in a measure out of accord with the penal
goals of retribution and deterrence. Imprisonment, corporeal punishment,
439 See Gershowitz, supra note 26, at 1288 (comparing the scrutiny of criminal sanctions to
punitive damages awards).
440 Browning-Ferris Indus. ofVt. V. Kelco, 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
441 /d. at 259-60.
442 See generally supra note 218.
443 517 U.S. 559, 614-17 (1996) (Ginsburg, 1., dissenting).
444/d. at 616-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
445/d. at617 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675 (1994)).
4461d. (citing S. 482, 68th Leg. (July 19, 1995) (enacted) (amending OR. REV. STAT. §§ 18.540
and 30.925 and repealing ORE. REV. STAT. § 14.315)).
447/d. at 618 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (3) (1992)).
448 See Little, supra note 6, at 204 ("While government agencies fill their coffers with proceeds
from drug-related seizures, instances offorfeiture abuse become more routine across the country."). See
also Johnson, supra note 26, at 510 (quoting a former head of the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture
Office describing that section's approach as "Forfeit, forfeit, forfeit. Get money, get money, get
money.").
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and even capital punishment cost a State money; fines are a source of
revenue.449
A couple of observations follow from this quote. First, fines are no
longer unique in resulting in a government's financial gain; as the above
paragraph indicates, the line between such forfeitures and punitive damages
awards is no longer so clear. Second, while criminal sanctions impose a
monetary cost on government, it is not true that such costs serve as a
sufficient check on the lengths of terms of imprisonment that exceed what
is necessary to achieve accepted goals of punishment. The enactment of
California's Three Strikes legislation is a good example of how public
pressure and an elected politician's "tough on crime" stance can result in
draconian criminal sentences. There are a couple of interesting aspects
about the context in which California's Three Strikes legislation came
about. First, initial efforts to pass the legislation were not effective until
the nationally publicized kidnapping and murder of young Polly Klaas.45o
The Klaas crime could not have changed the relevant data regarding
recidivism. As one commentator has observed:
Heightened fears of increased crime may lead to a belief that society
should tum its attention away from the rights of the accused and toward
an emphasis on public safety. These fears, and their accompanying shift
in public priorities, may carry the voters and their representatives on a
wave of retributive emotion to enact laws that might otherwise have faced
more intense scrutiny.451
More specifically, scholars have stated that "state politicians were
afraid to question the 'anti-crime fervor' that gripped the public following
the Klaas murder.'.452 Politicians who did question the measure "were
publicly derided and vilified.'.453 Indeed, "the public's fear of the
dangerous recidivist was translated into the political fear of the elected
official.'.454 Thus, anyone with political ambitions or who wanted to
remain in politics could hardly oppose Three Strikes without being labeled
"soft on crime."
Justice Scalia is correct that imposing criminal sanctions is a financial
burden borne by government. One study has concluded that "for the
[California] prison system, Three Strikes is a crisis deferreds one for which
'Californians will pay dearly ... on the installment plan. ".4 5 Even though
the Three Strikes law imposes a significant financial burden on California,
449 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979 n.9 (1991).
450 Vitiello, supra note 328, at 260.
451 Mark W. Owens, California's Three Strikes Law: Desperate Times Require Desperate
Measures-But Will 11 Work?, 26 PAC. LJ. 881, 882 (1995).
452 Luna, supra note 326, at 5 (citations omitted).
453 Id.
454 Id. See also Vitiello, supra note 328, at 280 ("Prominent politicians of virtually all political
stripes who lined up behind Three Strikes do not yet seem poised to withdraw their support. If
anything, the upcoming gubernatorial election will likely increase claims that Three Strikes has been
effective and that the particular candidates deserve credit for the decline in crime.").
455 Vitiello, supra note 328, at 280 (quoting Franklin E. Zimring, Gordon Hawkins & Sam Kamin,
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 138 (2001 ».
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this has not led to any reforms of the law, even in the context of cases like
Andrade where a defendant receives a life sentence when the third strike is
petty theft. Furthermore, as Erik Luna points out, "little political capital
was at stake b~ advocating Three Strikes-recidivists have few defenders
and no lobby." 56
This last point raises a concern Justice O'Connor emphasized with
respect to punitive damages awards in her dissenting opinion in TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., decided just two years after
Harmelin. Specifically, she expressed her concern that biased attitudes
toward corporations can result in excessive punitive damages awards:
"Courts long have recognized that jurors may view large corporations with
great disfavor.'.457 Further, "[c]orporations are mere abstractions and, as
such, are unlikely to be viewed with much sympathy.',458 Justice O'Connor
is concerned that bias and prejudice might influence the size of punitive
damages awards and argues that federal courts must intervene because
"[i]nfluences such as caprice, passion, bias, and prejudice are antithetical to
the rule of law. If there is a fixture of due process, it is that a verdict based
on such influences cannot stand.',459 Passion and bias against criminal
defendants is certainly greater and impacts all criminal defendants. The
events surrounding the passage of California's Three Strikes initiative is
another good example of how such passions against criminal defendants
can lead to draconian criminal sentences.460 In fact, such anti-criminal
passions are not limited to the Three Strikes law in California. Rather, this
initiative is one in a line of pro-victim and anti-criminal voter initiatives
passed in California. A number of commentators have lamented that
successful voter initiatives in California are the result of passion and bias
rather than careful reflection, especially when it comes to the rights of
criminal defendants.46 \ Justice O'Connor's worry about the prejudice faced
by defendant corporations who pay large punitive damages awards seems
almost silly when compared to the bias against criminal defendants who
may be deprived of their liberty for the rest of their lives.462 This is
especially true when, certainly as compared to criminal defendants,
corporations can exert influence in the political process.
456 Luna, supra note 326, at 6-7.
457 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 490 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4581d. at 491 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
459/d. at 475-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
460 See Franklin E. Zimring, Gordon Hawkins, & Sam Kamin, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY:
THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001).
461 I do not plan to explore the issue of direct democracy and the impact this has had on the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants under California's constitution. The following articles
represent a small portion of this vast literature. John H. Culver, The Transformation of the California
Supreme Court: 1977-1997,61 ALB. L. REV. 1461 (1998); Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional
Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M.L. REV. 199 (1998); Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword: The Direct
Ballot and State Constitutionalism, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 787 (1997); Dubber, supra note 333; Rachel A.
Van Cleave, A Constitution in Conflict: The Doctrine of Independent State Grounds and the Voter
Initiative in California, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95 (1993); Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law.
the United States Supreme Court. and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the
Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19 (1989).
462 In Lockyer v. Andrade, Justice Souter argues that Andrade's sentence amounts to a life
sentence. 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1176-77 (2003)(Souter, J., dissenting).
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The political process is very ineffective in ensuring that the rights of
criminal defendants and convicts will be protected or given adequate
consideration. Adam Gershowitz makes an excellent argument that this
justifies greater judicial scrutiny of criminal sanctions as compared to that
of punitive damages awards.463 This is especially true where criminal laws
are the result of public passions and perhaps even misconceptions
regarding criminals and crime rates. As two commentators have pointed
out, in the context of abortion, we do not leave other constitutional rights to
the whims of the political process.464 While severe, or even excessive,
criminal sanctions result in a financial cost to the government. Support of
such sentences often results in political rewards, and these punishments
should therefore be subject to the same degree of scrutiny as punitive
damages awards and forfeitures. "[PJolitics should not dictate
constitutional rights."465 .
The Supreme Court should have taken the opportunity it had in Ewing
and Andrade to implement meaningful proportionality review as to terms
of imprisonment, consistent with the State Farm, Gore, and Bajakajian
cases. Instead, the decisions of the 2002-2003 Term only highlighted the
serious inconsistency of the Court's review of different types of sanctions.
This article urges a consistent approach as to all of these sanctions. I
recognize arguments for making distinctions as to the level of scrutiny to
apply, but I believe that these either overlook important factors, such as
"the politics of crime,,,466 or are simply not strong enough to justify
different standards of review. Perhaps just as disturbing is the fact that the
Court gives no explanation or justification for the varying standards of
review, despite the three opportunities it had.
463 Gershowitz, supra note 26, at 1297-1301
464 Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 437, at 150-51 (discussing arguments pro-choice advocates
should direct to Justice O'Connor).
465 Id. at 155.
466 See Susan Estrich, Politics a/Crime Skips Over Issues, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1994, at 87.
